Buffalo Law Review
Volume 58

Number 3

Article 3

5-1-2010

Getting Back the Public's Money: The Anti-Favoritism Norm in
American Property Law
John Martinez
S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Recommended Citation
John Martinez, Getting Back the Public's Money: The Anti-Favoritism Norm in American Property Law, 58
Buff. L. Rev. 619 (2010).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol58/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

Getting Back the Public’s Money:
The Anti-Favoritism Norm in American
Property Law
JOHN MARTINEZ†
1

The government should not be regarded “as a cow to be milked.”

To lay with one hand the power of the government on the property of
the citizen, and with the other to bestow it upon favored individuals
to aid private enterprises and build up private fortunes, is none the
less a robbery because it is done under the forms of law and is called
taxation. This is not legislation. It is a decree under legislative
2
forms.
[T]he sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of
transferring it to another private party B . . . [in order to confer] a
3
private benefit on [party B].

INTRODUCTION
Should Congress earmark $5 million in the federal
defense budget for a contract to be awarded on a
noncompetitive basis to Storyrock, Inc., a private for-profit
video company, to make DVD scrapbooks of National Guard
units?4 This Article suggests that the anti-favoritism norm
† Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah. This
Article was funded in part by the University of Utah College of Law Excellence
in Teaching and Research Fund. I would like to thank my wife Karen Martinez
for helping me add greater clarity and good sense to this Article. I also would
like to thank John Bevan of the S.J. Quinney Law Library for his tireless help
in getting me the materials I needed for the project.
1. ROBERT K. MASSIE, PETER THE GREAT 781 (1980).
2. Citizens’ Savings & Loan Ass’n v. City of Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655,
664 (1874).
3. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005).
4. Matt Canham, Critics Bash Bennett Earmark, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 7,
2009, at A1, available at http://www.sltrib.com/ci_13500108?IADID=Searchwww.sltrib.com-www.sltrib.com. Storyrock, Inc. is a Utah for-profit corporation
based in Salt Lake City that has been registered since 2000. Utah Department
of Commerce Business Entity Search, https://secure.utah.gov/bes (search
“Storybrook”) (last visited Apr. 24, 2010); see also Remember My Service
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in American property law prohibits such government
transfers of public funds or assets to private parties on a
favored basis. The Article proposes an anti-favoritism legal
doctrine that allows the government or a private individual
to assert a claim for government recapture of such
transfers.
The Storyrock earmark touches a sensitive nerve in our
system of justice: no individual should be improperly
“singled out” by the government.5 We usually think of
improper “singling out” when the government imposes
unfair burdens.6 Thus, individual property owners are
protected from government imposition of unfair burdens by
Federal and state Just Compensation Clauses, which
prohibit “forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole.”7
Frequently Asked Questions, http://remembermyservice.com/faq.html#cost
(select “view pricing sheet”) (last visited Apr. 24, 2010) (noting that Storyrock
produces and sells DVDs to military units at prices ranging from $28 to $42,
depending how many DVDs are ordered).
5. See, for example, Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, 128 S.
Ct. 2146, 2153 (2008), where the Court stated that:
We expect . . . legislative or regulatory classifications to apply ‘without
respect to persons,’ to borrow a phrase from the judicial oath. See 28
U.S.C. § 453. As we explained long ago, the Fourteenth Amendment
‘requires that all persons subjected to . . . legislation shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both in the privileges
conferred and in the liabilities imposed.’
Id. (citing Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1887)).
6. See generally Richard J. Arneson, What is Wrongful Discrimination?, 43
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 775 (2006).
7. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). The Federal Just
Compensation Clause provides that “private property [shall not] be taken for
public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. Similar just
compensation provisions in state constitutions prohibit the “taking” of
“property” without payment of “just compensation.” See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 14 (“Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation . . . .”); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 22 (“Private property shall not be
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.”).
The author’s work in the Just Compensation Clause field includes: JOHN
MARTINEZ, GOVERNMENT TAKINGS (2006) [hereinafter MARTINEZ, GOVERNMENT
TAKINGS]; John Martinez, A Proposal for Establishing Specialized Federal and
State “Takings Courts,” 61 ME. L. REV. 467 (2009); John Martinez, Wrongful
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Improper “singling out” also occurs, however, when the
property rights of individuals are unfairly enhanced at the
expense of the public.8 The “anti-favoritism norm” in
Convictions as Rightful Takings: Protecting “Liberty-Property,” 59 HASTINGS L.J.
515 (2008); John Martinez & Karen L. Martinez, A Prudential Theory for
Providing a Forum for Federal Takings Claims, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
445 (2001); John Martinez & Nick J. Colessides, Taming the Takings Tiger, 12
UTAH B.J. 7 (1999); John Martinez, Framework for Addressing Takings
Problems, 9 UTAH B.J. 13 (1996); John Martinez, Statutes Enacting Takings
Law: Flying in the Face of Uncertainty, 26 URB. LAW. 327 (1994); John Martinez,
Trees in the Forest: A Reply to Professor Laitos’ “The Public Use Paradox and the
Takings Clause; A Critique of the Lucas Takings Doctrine,” 13 J. ENERGY NAT.
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 51 (1993); John Martinez, Taking Time Seriously: The
Federal Constitutional Right to be Free from “Startling” State Court
Overrulings, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 297 (1988); John Martinez,
Reconstructing Takings Doctrine by Redefining Property and Sovereignty, 16
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 157 (1988); John Martinez, A Critical Analysis of the 1987
Takings Trilogy: The Keystone, Nollan and First English Cases, 1 HOFSTRA
PROP. L.J. 39 (1988); see also 3 C. DALLAS SANDS, MICHAEL E. LIBONATI & JOHN
MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW ch. 16 (Land Development Regulation)
(2009) [hereinafter SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW];
JOHN MARTINEZ & MICHAEL E. LIBONATI, STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW: A
TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH (2000) [hereinafter MARTINEZ & LIBONATI, STATE &
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW].
8. Wood v. Budge, 374 P.2d 516, 519 (Utah 1962) (“It is an elementary
principle of justice that there should be ‘equal rights to all and special privileges
to none.’”). For general discussions of the anti-favoritism principle in American
law, see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547
(2001); and Daniel S. Hafetz, Ferreting Out Favoritism: Bringing Pretext Claims
After Kelo, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3095 (2009).
Bell and Parchomovsky were the first to discuss the anti-favoritism norm
in general terms, but they did not formulate a workable legal doctrine for
implementing the norm. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra, at 551 n.16 (“While
we argue that a law of givings is necessary, we do not opine on whether it
should be viewed as a branch of constitutional law, nor on what branch of
government should be responsible for instituting the law of givings.”). This
Article seeks to fill that gap. Moreover, Bell and Parchomovsky conceived of
“givings” as the mirror image of the field of “takings.” See Bell & Parchomovsky,
supra, at 591 (“We propose that this line dividing chargeable givings from
nonchargeable distributions should mirror the line between compensable
takings and noncompensable deprivations of property.”). However, as this
Article demonstrates, the field of anti-favoritism has a different pedigree and
purpose and is subject to different analysis, more than simply as a mirror image
of the takings field. Conceiving of anti-favoritism as a free-standing norm helps
with understanding and formulation of a cogent anti-favoritism legal doctrine.
Criminal prosecution of public corruption also enforces the antifavoritism norm. See generally Aaron R. Petty, Note, How Qui Tam Actions
Could Fight Public Corruption, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 851, 852 (2006)
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American property law seeks to prevent such unfair
enhancements.9
The Storyrock earmark, involving the award of
government contracts on a favored basis, is only one of
several settings that raise anti-favoritism concerns. A
second setting involves government award of outright
grants on a favored basis. The recession of 2008-2009
generated widespread public resentment with the federal
government’s award of bailouts to private companies and
industries. Between September 2008 and July 2009,
American International Group, Incorporated (AIG), the
(“[F]ederal criminal statutes commonly used to prosecute state and local officials
for public corruption should be amended to include a qui tam cause of action
similar to that found in the False Claims Act.”); FBI, Public Corruption,
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/pubcorrupt/pubcorrupt.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2010)
(“Public corruption is of the FBI’s top investigative priorities—behind only
terrorism, espionage, and cyber crimes.”). This Article differs from the field of
criminal prosecution of public corruption in at least three significant ways: first,
this Article includes governmental conduct which might not rise to the level of
criminal conduct; second, the Article suggests recognition of a civil, not criminal,
action to enforce the anti-favoritism norm; and third, the Article recommends a
claim that would be brought by private parties, not by the government.
9. The question whether affirmative action programs may improperly
enhance the private property rights of some individuals and thus constitute
improper “singling out” in that context is beyond the scope of this Article. See
generally Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to
Distributive Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 515 (1992) (stating that equal treatment
presupposes people are equally situated; if they are not, then unequal treatment
in the form of affirmative action may constitute appropriate corrective justice).
For the author’s writings on that question, see SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ,
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra note 7, § 10:23 (affirmative action in
employment), § 20:89 (affirmative action in education); John Martinez,
Trivializing Diversity: The Problem of Overinclusion in Affirmative Action
Programs, 12 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 49 (1995); John Martinez, The Use of
Transfer Policies for Achieving Diversity in Law Schools, 14 CHICANO-LATINO L.
REV. 139 (1994); Juan Martinez, Book Review, 9 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 163
(1992) (reviewing P. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991)).
Moreover, affirmative action law has moved from a justification based on
both the benefit to the institution as well as on the individual or group
benefitted, to a justification based only on the benefit to the institution. See
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (holding that an affirmative
action program can only be justified by law school’s compelling state interest in
seeking to achieve diversity). The law on affirmative action thus now
exemplifies the anti-favoritism principle at work: government affirmative action
programs cannot favor an individual or group simply for the sake of favoring
that individual or group.
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biggest insurance company in the United States, received
$182 billion in federal bailout money, the largest in
American history.10 AIG then paid out $165 million in
bonuses, generating public outrage demanding that the
Obama Administration and Congress get the bonus money
back and exercise greater supervision over how AIG spent
the bailout money.11 AIG’s troubles continued when one of
its traders demanded to be paid a $100 million bonus.12
Similarly, banks that received $175 billion in federal bailout
money and paid out $32.6 billion in bonuses caused a public
outcry demanding return of the bonuses.13
A third government favoritism setting involves
government regulatory conduct on a favored basis. For
example, government zoning of a single lot for apartments,
when all other lots in the area are restricted to single-family
residence construction, enhances the value of the up-zoned
lot on a favored basis.14 A fourth government favoritism
setting
occurs
when
government
infrastructure
improvements, such as the construction of a sports stadium,
which enhances the value of the surrounding properties, is

10. New York Times, Company Profile - American International Group,
Inc., http://www.nytimes.com/pages/business/index.html (search “American
International Group”) (last visited Apr. 24, 2010).
11. Matt Jaffe, Dispute with Bailout Watchdog Stems From AIG Bonus Audit;
Now Congressman Calls for Investigation, ABC NEWS, June 19, 2009,
http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2009/06/treasury-dispute-with-bailoutwatchdog-stems-from-aig-bonus-audit-now-congressman-calls-for-investigation.
html.
12. David Segal, Traders’ $100 Million Payday Poses Quandary for
Regulators, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2009, at A1.
13. Jake Tapper, The Bonus Battle: Executive Compensation Under the
Spotlight, Again, ABC NEWS, Aug. 3, 2009, http://www.abcnews.go.co
m/Politics/Business/story?id=8237258&page=1. As the Obama administration
and Congress quickly discovered, however, in the absence of statutes or state
constitutional provisions, there is no established legal doctrine for getting back
the public’s money. President Barack Obama publicly criticized the bonuses
paid by AIG and the banks and appointed a “pay czar” to oversee compensation
packages at companies that received bailout funds. Id. On March 19, 2009, the
House of Representatives voted 328 to 93 to tax the AIG bonuses at 90%, but by
then most of the bonuses had been returned. New York Times, supra note 10.
14. For discussion of such “spot zoning,” see SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ,
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra note 7, § 16:8 n.7 (collecting cases).
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sited so as to favor the limited number of people in the
area.15
Unlike the express prohibitions in Federal and state
Just Compensation Clauses against governmental
imposition of unfair burdens, there is no analogous
provision in the Federal Constitution that expressly
prohibits governmental favoritism. State constitutions, in
contrast, contain provisions such as the prohibition against
the gift of public funds for private purposes which expressly
prohibit
government
favoritism.16
But
judicial
interpretations of such prohibitions have rendered them
ineffectual at preventing government favoritism.17
Implementation of the anti-favoritism norm, therefore,
has been left by default to legislation, such as the Federal

15. See, e.g., CLEAN v. State, 928 P.2d 1054 (Wash. 1996) (holding a statute
granting funding for the construction of a baseball stadium constitutional).
16. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 6 (“The Legislature shall have no . . .
power to make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any public money
or thing of value to any individual, municipal or other corporation
whatever . . . .”); N.Y. CONST. art. 7, § 8 (“The money of the state shall not be
given or loaned to or in aid of any private corporation or association, or private
undertaking . . . .”); WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 5 (“The credit of the state shall
not, in any manner be given or loaned to, or in aid of, any individual,
association, company or corporation.”), § 7 (“No county, city, town or other
municipal corporation shall hereafter give any money, or property . . . to or in
aid of any individual, association, company or corporation . . . .”).
17. See, e.g., Wistuber v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 687 P.2d 354,
357 (Ariz. 1984) (adopting a standard requiring something more than a mere
“public purpose” to justify a school district’s release of a teachers’ union
president from teaching duties while continuing to pay part of her salary, the
court holds that the something more standard is satisfied where services
provided to the district by the teacher were “not so inequitable and
unreasonable” as to “amount[ ] to an abuse of discretion”).
For an excellent discussion of the origins and subsequent decline of “gift
of public funds” prohibitions in state constitutions, see Richard Briffault, The
Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and State Constitutional Law, 34
RUTGERS L.J. 907, 909 (2003), who writes, “Judicial interpretations have
effectively nullified the public purpose requirements that ostensibly prevent
state and local spending, lending, and borrowing in aid of private endeavors.”
See Dale F. Rubin, Public Purpose in the Northwest: A Sinkhole of Judicial
Interpretation - The Case for Alternatives in the Delivery of Public Services and
the Granting of Subsidies, 32 IDAHO L. REV. 417, 419 (1996) (“[Court review is a]
judicial rubber stamp of approval for virtually any expenditure which a public
body label[s as being] for a ‘public purpose.’”).

2010]

GETTING BACK THE PUBLIC’S MONEY

625

False Claims Act,18 state false claims acts,19 and state
whistleblower statutes.20 This effectively leaves the foxes in
charge of the henhouse.21
This Article suggests that the anti-favoritism norm is
an integral part of the fabric of our system of jurisprudence,
that it was unfortunately and improperly ensnared in the
anti-Lochner reaction against searching judicial review of
economic legislation in the middle of the twentieth century,
and that it is once more reemerging as a critical part of our
system of justice.
The Article proposes an anti-favoritism legal doctrine to
implement the rejuvenated anti-favoritism norm. The
proposed doctrine allows the government to assert a claim
for recapture of public funds or assets transferred to private
parties for private purposes in violation of the antifavoritism norm. The doctrine further provides that if the
government does not recapture such funds or assets on its
own, then private parties can assert a claim to force the
government to do so.
The proposed legal doctrine provides for consideration of
the following factors:
1. Do the circumstances warrant judicial intervention as
a threshold matter?
a. Is the subsidy substantial or trivial in amount?
b. Does the government receive significant monetary
consideration in return?
18. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (Supp. 2009). See generally SANDS, LIBONATI &
MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra note 7, § 29:9 (False Claims Act).
19. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12650-12655 (Supp. 2010); FLA. STAT.
§ 68.081 (2009); OKLA. STAT. tit. 62, §§ 372-373 (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-18101 (2009). See generally Taxpayers Against Fraud Educ. Fund, The False
Claims Act Legal Center, State False Claims Acts, http://www.taf.o
rg/statefca.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2010) [hereinafter Qui Tam Actions]
(listing state False Claims Acts with qui tam provisions).
20. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §68.087(8) (2009); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 175/1
(2009). See generally SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW,
supra note 7, § 10:68 (state whistleblower statutes).
21. Cf. Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress: Earmark Rules and
Statutory Interpretation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 519, 522 (2009) (stating that House
and Senate earmark rules are “‘self-referential,’” in that they are “rules adopted
by the foxes to govern administration of the henhouse”).

626

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

c. Do the circumstances demonstrate that the
transaction is in good faith, not on a preferential
favoritism basis?
2. Is there a controlling public purpose?
a. Is there a public purpose at all?
b. Does the recipient’s activity have independent
public significance, analogous to a highway, railroad,
canal, or other “instrumentality of commerce,” such that
the subsidy involved is unquestionably for a “public
purpose”?
c. Is the public purpose inherent in the recipient’s
activity the controlling public purpose for the subsidy,
such that the benefit to the private party is merely
incidental?
3. Is the subsidy indispensable for the private party’s
achievement of the public purpose?
That is, is the subsidy necessary because otherwise, the
operation of the free market would threaten the very
existence of the private enterprise involved or completely
block the private party from achieving the public purpose?
4. Are there factors indicating that public control over
the subsidy in the hands of the private party is retained by
the government, such as: (a) defeasible title, such that the
private party will lose title to the asset if it is no longer used
for the purpose for which eminent domain was exercised; (b)
an enforceable agreement by the private party to use the
asset for the purpose for which eminent domain was
exercised; or (c) continuing public agency oversight and
direction of the use of the asset by the private party for the
purpose for which eminent domain was exercised?
Part I of this Article sets out the historical and
philosophical foundations of the anti-favoritism norm in
American property law. Part II focuses on the evolution of
the anti-favoritism norm in the United States Supreme
Court. That part explains how the anti-Lochnerism
movement improperly caused the Court to simultaneously
retreat from the anti-favoritism norm, but that in recent
cases the Court has once more rejuvenated the antifavoritism norm.
Part III describes the federal and state constitutional
foundations for a legal doctrine that will implement the
rejuvenated anti-favoritism norm. Part IV sets out the
substantive content of the proposed anti-favoritism legal
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doctrine and explains its operation. Part V addresses
potential issues regarding the proposed doctrine.
I. HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
“ANTI-FAVORITISM” NORM
A. Kings Can Play Favorites
Kings traditionally combined public interest and royal
self-interest, an idea best captured by the dictum of King
Louis XIV of France that “l’etat çest Moi.”22 Thus, the king
was free to favor anyone with the property under his control
or with regulatory edicts making some richer than others at
his whim.23 It was not until the Magna Carta, signed by
King John on June 15, 1215, at Runnymeade, England that
the king at least nominally became subject to the law.24
How, exactly, subject to the law the king’s decisions to favor
some and not others remained a problem.
B. Qui Tam
“The phrase qui tam is a shortened version of the Latin
phrase ‘qui tam pro domino rege, quam pro se ipso in hac
parte sequitur,’ meaning ‘who prosecutes this suit as well
for the king, as for himself.’”25 A qui tam action allowed a
22. This translates into, “The State, it is I.” See Michael J. Kelly, Can
Sovereigns Be Brought to Justice? The Crime of Genocide’s Evolution and the
Meaning of the Milosevic Trial, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 257, 323 (2002).
23. For a discussion of the status of English kings as both sovereigns and
property owners, see 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERICK WILLIAM MAITLAND,
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 511 (2d ed.
1968), who writes, “The king has a body corporate in a body natural and a body
natural in a body corporate.” See 3 W. S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 468 (3d ed. 1923) (“[That] the king might be seised of land in right of crown
or otherwise [is a recognition of a] difference between the person and the office
of the king.”).
24. Kelly, supra note 22, at 323 (referring to the Magna Carta as “first crack
in [the] wall” of royal sovereign immunity from suit). See generally A.E. DICK
HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT AND COMMENTARY (rev. ed. 1998) (1964).
25. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *160. For a history of qui tam in
England and the United States, see Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. U.S
ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774-77 (2000). See generally SANDS, LIBONATI &
MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra note 7, § 29:9 (discussing qui tam
concept).
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private individual to bring an action to recover assets that
belonged to the king, while at the same time recovering a
bounty for doing so.26
1. Common Law Qui Tam. Qui tam proceedings began
as avenues for plaintiffs to get access to royal courts by
alleging that not only were the plaintiff’s private interests
involved, but that the interests of the king were at stake as
well.27 By the fourteenth century, as royal courts became
generally available to resolve purely private disputes, the
need for common law qui tam fell away.28 By the period
immediately before and after the framing of the United
States Constitution, common law qui tam was dying out
altogether, both in England and in the Colonies as well.29
2. Federal Qui Tam Statutes. Qui tam became available,
if at all, only through statutes. In an ironic twist, while
common law qui tam had required the assertion that the
king’s interest was at stake, statutory qui tam instead
required the assertion that a private interest was at stake
in order to satisfy the requirement of standing. In Vermont
Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel.
Stevens,30 the Court held that although a qui tam relator
did not have standing based on his quest for a bounty in the
form of a portion of the government’s recovery, the relator
nevertheless had “representational standing,” as a partial
assignee of the government’s claim for recovery.31
The Federal False Claims Act (FCA),32 originally
enacted in 1863, is the federal statute most specifically
directed toward providing a federal statutory claim for the
recovery by the government of federal funds or assets
inappropriately conferred on private parties for private
26. See generally Petty, supra note 8; Note, The History and Development of
Qui Tam, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 81.
27. Note, supra note 26, at 85.
28. Id.
29. Stevens, 529 U.S. at 776.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 773-74 & n.4 (“More precisely, we are asserting that a qui tam
relator is, in effect, suing as a partial assignee of the United States.”).
32. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (Supp. 2009). For discussion of the Federal False
Claims Act, see SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra
note 7, § 29:9 (qui tam actions).
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purposes.33 The Act provides that any person who causes
false claims to be presented to the United States for
payment or who forms a conspiracy to have false claims
paid by the United States is liable for treble damages and
civil penalties.34 The federal government itself may bring
the action against the false claimant,35 or a private person
may do so by bringing a qui tam action “for the person and
for the United States Government” against the alleged false
claimant “in the name of the Government.”36
There are significant limitations on the availability of
qui tam actions under the Federal False Claims Act.
Although claims under the Act can be brought against local
governments for federal money improperly paid,37 states are
not proper defendants because they are not “persons” under
the Act.38 In addition, there are formidable substantive and
procedural obstacles that a claimant must overcome.
Substantively, for a false claim to be actionable under the

33. Three other federal qui tam statutes, all also enacted over 100 years ago,
are still in effect. 25 U.S.C. § 81 (2006) (providing cause of action and share of
recovery against a person contracting with Indians in an unlawful manner); 25
U.S.C. § 201 (2006) (providing cause of action and share of recovery against a
person violating Indian protection laws); 35 U.S.C. § 292(b) (2006) (providing
cause of action and share of recovery against a person falsely marking patented
articles); see also 18 U.S.C. § 962 (2006) (providing for forfeiture to informer of
share of vessels privately armed against friendly nations, but not expressly
authorizing suit by informer); 46 U.S.C. § 80103 (2006) (providing for forfeiture
to informer of share of vessels removing property from “a wreck, the sea, or a
key or shoal” off the Florida coast to foreign nations, but not expressly
authorizing suit by informer); Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act of 1986, 31
U.S.C. § 3801 (2006 & Supp. 2008) (creating administrative remedies for false
claims and granting enforcement powers to the United States only).
34. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (Supp. 2009).
35. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) (2006).
36. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2006). For an excellent discussion of the history of
qui tam actions in England and America, see Stevens, 529 U.S. at 774-77, where
the Court discusses how there is no evidence that common law qui tam actions
were ever allowed in America.
37. Cook County, Ill. v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119 (2003)
(holding local governments are “persons” for purposes of qui tam actions under
the False Claims Act).
38. Stevens, 529 U.S. at 765 (holding that states are not “persons” for
purposes of qui tam actions under the False Claims Act).
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FCA, it must have been made “knowingly.”39 The Act
defines “knowing” and “knowingly” to mean:
that a person, with respect to information—(1) has actual
knowledge of the information; (2) acts in deliberate ignorance of
the truth or falsity of the information; or (3) acts in reckless
disregard of the truth or falsity of the information, and require no
40
proof of specific intent to defraud.

Procedural constraints on claimants under the Act are
also myriad. A claimant under the Act must file the initial
complaint in camera, where it remains under seal for at
least sixty days while the government investigates the
allegations and decides whether it wants to intervene in the
action.41 If the United States chooses not to intervene, the
claimant may continue alone on behalf of the government.42
The United States nonetheless retains significant control
over the action. The government is entitled to monitor the
proceedings,43 to have discovery stayed if discovery would
interfere with its investigation or prosecution of a criminal
or civil suit arising out of the same facts,44 and retains the
right to intervene at any time for good cause.45 Further, the
qui tam action “may be dismissed only if the court and the
Attorney General give written consent to the dismissal and
their reasons for consenting.”46
3. State Qui Tam Statutes. Qui tam actions are similarly
available under state false claims acts47 or whistleblower
statutes,48 but claimants are strictly limited in regard to
39. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1).
40. Id. § 3729(b)(1).
41. Id. § 3730(b)(2).
42. Id. §§ 3730(b)(4)(B), 3730(c)(3).
43. Id. § 3730(c)(3) (codifying that the United States may require service of
copies of all pleadings and deposition transcripts).
44. Id. § 3730(c)(4).
45. Id. § 3730(c)(3).
46. Id. § 3730(b)(1).
47. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12650-12655 (2009); FLA. STAT. § 68.081
(2009); OKLA. ST. tit. 62, §§ 372, 373 (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-18-101 (2009).
See generally Qui Tam Actions, supra note 19.
48. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 68.087(8) (2009); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/1-8
(2009). See generally SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW,
supra note 7, § 10:68 (state whistleblower statutes).
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such actions. For example, in Scachitti v. UBS Financial
Services,49 the court held that qui tam actions under the
Illinois Whistleblower Reward and Protection Act were
validly pursued only as long as they were used to support
the attorney general’s constitutional duties rather than
usurping them. Thus, the court held, qui tam plaintiffs
could only bring actions under the statute as long as the
attorney general retained authority to control the litigation,
with the power to settle or dismiss the lawsuit without the
qui tam plaintiff’s consent—even when the attorney general
had declined to intervene in the action.50
Similarly, in State ex rel. Wright v. Oklahoma Corp.
Commission,51 the court noted that “[t]he qui tam interest of
taxpayers is . . . limited to that created by the qui tam
statute.”52 In that case, the party allegedly improperly
favored by the government brought a pre-emptive
declaratory judgment action in which the qui tam
petitioners then sought to intervene. The court noted that
petitioners were required to show that the declaratory
judgment action was insufficient to determine the qui tam
claim before they could intervene.53
C. Public Trust Doctrine
Government transfers on a favored basis cannot occur
at all if the particular asset involved is subject to the “public
trust” doctrine.54 That doctrine provides that there are
certain resources that belong to all and cannot be owned by
any individual.55 The Magna Carta incorporated the concept
by prohibiting the king from conveying property rights to

49. Scachitti v. UBS Fin. Servs., 831 N.E.2d 544 (Ill. 2005).
50. Id. at 560-61.
51. State ex rel. Wright v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 2007 OK 73, 170 P.3d 1024.
52. Id. at 2007 OK ¶ 58, 170 P.3d at 1041.
53. Id.
54. See generally Timothy M. Mulvaney, Instream Flows and the Public
Trust, 22 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 315, 345-48 (2009) (reviewing the history of the public
trust doctrine).
55. THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 90 n.1 (Thomas Collett Sandars trans., 7th
ed. 1956) (1905) (“By the law of nature these things are common to mankind—
the air, running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea.”).
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waterways subject to the public trust.56 The king had no
power to transfer such assets.57
As a result of the American Revolution, the states
succeeded to the king’s interest and obligations with respect
to assets subject to the public trust doctrine in this
country.58 The federal government also acts as a steward for
certain assets subject to the public trust. Through the
Commerce Clause, navigable waters are deemed to be “the
public property of the nation” under the control of Congress
for the purpose of ensuring navigation.59
The public trust doctrine requires states and the federal
government to recapture assets subject to the public trust
that have been transferred into private hands.60 Although
the doctrine originally applied only to lands covered by
ocean tide waters, it has been extended to apply to
submerged lands in the Great Lakes as well.61 The
California Supreme Court has further extended the doctrine
to water rights in Mono Lake, holding that the rights to use
56. MAGNA CARTA art. 23 (1215).
57. Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 411 (1842) (holding that such
attempted transfers do not pass title to the assets subject to the public trust,
which “still remains in the crown[,] for the benefit and advantage of the whole
community”).
58. St. Clair County v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. 46, 68 (1874) (“By the American
Revolution the people of each State, in their sovereign character, acquired the
absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soil under them.”).
59. Gilman v. City of Phila., 70 U.S. 713, 724-25 (1865) (“Commerce includes
navigation. The power to regulate commerce comprehends the control for that
purpose . . . . For this purpose they are the public property of the nation . . . .”);
see also United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 122-23 (1967) (“The Commerce
Clause confers a unique position upon the Government in connection with
navigable waters. . . . This power to regulate navigation confers upon the United
States a ‘dominant servitude’ . . . [which] extends to the entire stream bed below
ordinary high-water mark.”).
60. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (N.D. Ill. 1892) (“A grant
[of assets subject to the public trust doctrine] . . . has never been adjudged to be
within the legislative power; and any attempted grant of the kind would be held,
if not absolutely void on its face, as subject to revocation.”).
61. Id. (“It is only by observing the distinction between a grant of such
parcels for the improvement of the public interest, or which when occupied do
not substantially impair the public interest in the lands and waters remaining,
and a grant of the whole property in which the public is interested, that the
language of the adjudged cases can be reconciled.”).
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water from the lake previously appropriated to the City of
Los Angeles can, in effect, be redefined to make sure they
are consistent with the state’s public trust interest.62
The principal difficulty with the public trust doctrine is
that only assets subject to the public trust are covered.
Although it has been judicially extended to cover freshwater
lakes and streams, it is still restricted to navigable waters
and adjacent shores. Moreover, judicial extensions of the
doctrine are subject to subsequent legislative curtailment.
For example, the Idaho Supreme Court in 1995 followed the
California approach in extending the state’s public trust
doctrine to cover previously appropriated water rights,63 but
the next year, the Idaho Legislature passed a statute
restricting the state’s public trust doctrine to its traditional
scope as a limitation on the state’s power to transfer lands
underlying navigable waters.64
D. Special Assessments
A special assessment is a charge imposed on property
owners within a limited area to help pay the cost of a local
infrastructure improvement which specially benefits
property within that area.65 A municipal project to widen
the street on a residential cul-de-sac is an example of a local
infrastructure improvement that might be undertaken
through a special assessment. Special assessment projects
are authorized and conducted pursuant to statutory
authority.66
A determination that an improvement is needed begins
the special assessment process.67 A proposed allocation of
62. Nat’l Audobon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709,
728 (Cal. 1983) (“The state has an affirmative duty to take the public trust into
account in the planning and allocation of water resources, and to protect public
trust uses whenever feasible.”).
63. See Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass’n v. State, 899 P.2d 949 (Idaho 1995); Idaho
Conservation League v. State, 911 P.2d 748 (Idaho 1995).
64. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 58-1201 to 58-1203 (2008).
65. See, e.g., Covell v. City of Seattle, 905 P.2d 324 (Wash. 1995). See
generally SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra note 7,
ch. 24 (special assessments).
66. SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra note 7,
§ 24:1.
67. Id. § 24:20.
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estimated costs must then be prepared. That requires two
steps: first, determination of the zone of private benefit;
second, apportionment of costs among individual properties
in the zone of private benefit.68 The first step,
“[d]etermining the zone of private benefit consists of: (1)
identifying the total private benefits produced by an
improvement; and (2) locating the properties upon which
such benefits are conferred.”69 “[I]dentification of the total
private benefits requires: (a) characterization of the effects
of an improvement as ‘benefits’, and (b) further
categorization of such benefits as either ‘public’ (general) or
‘private’ (local).”70 “[L]ocation of the properties upon which
private benefits are conferred, is usually not difficult once
those benefits are identified . . . [since such] benefits may be
geographically defined . . . as physically adjacent to the
improvement or functionally defined, usually accruing to
users of the improvement.”71
The second step, apportioning the costs among
properties
in the zone of private benefit, requires: (1) determination of the
total public and private benefits produced by a special assessment
improvement, (2) identification of the components of the
improvement which produced the public benefits and those that
produced the private benefits, (3) determination of the costs of the
public-benefit-producing components (public costs) of the
improvement and of the costs of the private-benefit-producing
components (private costs) and (4) apportionment of the private
costs of the improvement among the properties in the zone of
private benefit.72

A special assessment becomes an obligation and lien on the
land upon which it is imposed.73

68. Id. § 24:22.
69. Id. § 24:23.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. § 24:24.
73. City of Kenner v. Jo, Inc., 541 So. 2d 311, 315 (La. App. 1989) (holding
that a special assessment is against land); Coral Gables v. Bd. of Pub.
Instruction, 313 So. 2d 92, 95 (Fla. App. 1975). See generally SANDS, LIBONATI &
MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra note 7, § 24:36.
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If the costs imposed on a property owner exceed the
benefits conferred by a special assessment project, then the
owner will be compensated.74 Conversely, if the benefits
exceed the costs, the owner will be charged a special
assessment.75
Special assessments implement the anti-favoritism
norm by preventing transfers of public funds to private
parties on the favored basis that such parties happen to own
land in the special assessment project area. Such recapture,
however, is restricted to limited-area public infrastructure
improvement projects that characterize special assessment
projects.
E. “Betterment” Recapture Legislation
Legislation in England seeking to recapture land value
increases from public projects or favorable zoning has been
around since about 1662.76 In 1879, Henry George
recommended enactment of legislation imposing a
comprehensive land tax to recapture all increment in land

74. SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra note 7,
§ 24:23 (discussing imposition of harms by special assessment project which
may require compensation to owners).
75. Id. § 24:23 (stating that costs must be properly apportioned); id. § 24:30
(stating that apportionment of costs may be challenged by owners).
76. EXPERT COMMITTEE ON COMPENSATION AND BETTERMENT, MINISTRY OF
WORKS & PLANNING, FINAL REPORT 107, Cmd. 6386 (1942) [hereinafter UTHWATT
REPORT] (referring to Act 13 & 14 Chas. II, ch. 2). But see MADELYN GLICKFELD
ET AL., WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION 491
(Donald G. Hagman & Dean J. Misczynski eds., 1978) [hereinafter GLICKFELD ET
AL.] (noting that Charles Haar, in his book Land Planning in a Free Society is
skeptical that the statute referred to by the Uthwatt Report was indeed a
betterment statute). See CHARLES HAAR, LAND PLANNING IN A FREE SOCIETY 95-96
(1952).
The concept of betterment recapture is known by various other names,
including “recoupment,” see Andrew Berchard, A Comparison of U.S.-Canadian
Excess Condemnation, Expropriation and Property Taking, 9 IN PUB. INT. 3, 9
(1989) (advocating a “niceness” approach to recoupment of excess private gains),
and “social increment” recapture, Raymond R. Coletta, Reciprocity of Advantage
and Regulatory Takings: Toward a New Theory of Takings Jurisprudence, 40
AM. U. L. REV. 297, 364-65 (1990) (arguing that minimal judicial review under
the Due Process Clause should be used to ensure social increment is
recaptured).
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value resulting from the general growth of industrial
society.77
The Tower Bridge Southern Approach Act of 1895
provided for such “betterment” recapture, but only applied
to enhancements caused by a public infrastructure project.78
England’s “Housing, Town Planning, etc. Act 1909” provided
for the recapture of land value increases due to zoning.79
The 1909 Act was replaced by a 1947 statute.80 Problems in
administering both statutes proved insurmountable,
however, and they were never fully implemented.81
Broader legislation has been suggested which would
cover enhancements which would cover all government
conduct that enhances private property—not just zoning or
public
infrastructure
construction—as
well
as
enhancements to all types of private property interests—not
just to land value.82 Although land value taxation schemes
77. H. GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY (1879); see also Richard A. Jaffe &
Stephen Sherrill, Comment, Grand Central Terminal and the New York Court of
Appeals: “Pure” Due Process, Reasonable Return, and Betterment Recovery, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 134, 157 (1978) (discussing Henry George proposal, the authors
note that, “[t]he basic concept of betterment recovery is by no means new”).
The ideas of Henry George have met with mixed reviews. Compare John
J. Costonis, The Disparity Issue: A Context for the Grand Central Terminal
Decision, 91 HARV. L. REV. 402, 416-17 (1977) (criticizing betterment recapture
theory of Henry George as akin to the “search for Holy Grail”), with Samuel B.
Clarke, Criticisms Upon Henry George, Reviewed from the Stand-Point of
Justice, 1 HARV. L. REV. 265 (1888) (supporting Henry George’s ideas and
defends them against early criticisms).
78. GLICKFELD ET AL., supra note 76, at 491 (discussing the London County
Council (Tower Bridge Southern Approach) Act, 1895).
79. Id. at 492-93.
80. Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 51 (Eng.).
81. GLICKFELD ET AL., supra note 76, at xxxi-xliv; see also Margaret H. Clune,
Government Hardly Could Go On: Oregon’s Measure 37, Implications for Land
Use Planning and a More Rational Means of Compensation, 38 URB. LAW. 275,
303-04 (2006) (reviewing the history of English betterment legislation).
82. See, e.g., Daniel D. Barnhizer, Givings Recapture: Funding Public
Acquisition of Private Property Interests on the Coasts, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
295, 357 n.269 (2003) (recommending that instead of using regulatory
mechanisms like open-space zoning, setback requirements, or prohibitions on
development, the federal government should protect coastal floodplains by more
readily engaging in direct condemnation—and factoring in the deduction of
publicly-added value from the compensation amounts, which would make the
use of direct condemnation more economically viable for the government); Eric
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have been enacted in various countries and states in the
United States, they have also “had a history of
nonenforcement and repeal.”83
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE “ANTI-FAVORITISM” NORM IN THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
The United States Supreme Court enforced the antifavoritism norm throughout the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries and it continues to do so in the twentyfirst century. The path of such enforcement, however, has
been neither smooth nor straight.
The Court’s anti-favoritism jurisprudence during the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries prohibited the
unfair enhancement of individual property rights at the
expense of the public by Congress and state legislatures
because it was not a “public purpose.”84 The Court based
such jurisprudence on the Federal Due Process Clauses85
and the Taxing and Spending Clause.86 That period in antifavoritism jurisprudence, however, eventually overlapped
with the Lochner era,87 from 1905 through 1937,88 when the

Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1491 (1999) (defining windfalls as
“economic gains independent of work, planning, or other productive activities
that society wishes to reward”).
83. Douglas W. Kmiec, Deregulating Land Use: An Alternative Free
Enterprise Development System, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 28, 123-25 (1981) (citing
examples in England, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, California, Hawaii, and
Vermont).
84. The classic case illustrating the approach is Citizens’ Savings & Loan
Ass’n v. City of Topeka. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 664 (1874) (“To lay with one hand
the power of the government on the property of the citizen, and with the other to
bestow it upon favored individuals to aid private enterprises and build up
private fortunes, is none the less a robbery because it is done under the forms of
law and is called taxation. This is not legislation. It is a decree under legislative
forms.”).
85. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive
any person of . . . property, without due process of law . . . .”).
86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States . . . .”).
87. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating restriction on
bakers’ working hours).
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Court engaged in activist judicial review of economic
legislation under the Due Process and Contract Clauses.89
In both anti-favoritism and Lochnerism jurisprudence,
the Court second-guessed governmental determinations, but
in dramatically different ways. Anti-favoritism decisions
closely examined whether the objective sought to be
attained was actually “public”—in advance of the general
welfare—or instead “private”—serving only to enhance the
purely private interest of a single person or a small group of
beneficiaries of government largesse. Lochnerism decisions
closely examined whether the objective sought to be
attained—even if public—would detrimentally affect private
property rights.90 The net result of Lochnerism was to
protect private property rights at the cost of invalidating
state and federal legislation aimed at pulling the country
out of the Great Depression.91 The private property rightsprotection dimension of Lochnerism simultaneously raised
the separate and distinct “counter-majoritarian difficulty,”
whereby unelected judges overrode the determinations of
elected political bodies and officials, action viewed as
illegitimate in a democratic society.92
88. The Lochner era is generally understood to have ended with the Court’s
decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish. 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding
minimum wage law). The Lochner approach was firmly rejected in Ferguson v.
Skrupa. 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (upholding state statute making it a misdemeanor
for any person to engage in the business of debt adjusting except as an incident
to the lawful practice of law).
89. Ellen Frankel Paul, Freedom of Contract and the “Political Economy” of
Lochner v. New York, 1 N.Y.U. J. LAW & LIB. 515, 520 (2005) (considering, after
examining the criticisms against Lochnerism, whether a strategy “more
explicitly tied to the Constitution’s political heritage . . . could have produced a
more viable, consistent, and defensible ground upon which to stake liberty of
contract under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments”).
90. See generally id.
91. See Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review,
and the Bill of Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941, 949-52 (1999) (describing the
standard critique of Lochnerism as overriding New Deal legislation under the
banner of private property rights protection).
92. The phrase “counter-majoritarian difficulty,” is a shorthand expression of
the problem of reconciling judicial review of political branches by unelected
judges in a democratic society. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962)
(“The root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our
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When faced with a political threat from President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt to pack the court with additional
Justices who would support his New Deal legislation,93 the
Court abandoned activist judicial review seeking to protect
economic interests under the Due Process and Contract
Clauses. At the same time it abandoned Lochnerism,
however, the Court also retreated from its enforcement of
the anti-favoritism norm.94
In retreating from enforcing the anti-favoritism norm at
the same time that it retreated from enforcing the
protection of private property rights, however, the Court
threw out the baby with the bathwater. Both settings
involved second-guessing of government determinations,
but they were categorically different. Lochnerism protected
individual property owners by invalidating supposedly
unfair burdens on private property, whereas the antifavoritism norm protected the general public by invalidating
unfair conferral of benefits that did not advance the general
welfare. Lochnerism thus was aimed at protecting
individual property owners; anti-favoritism is aimed at
protecting the public.

system.”). For classic explorations of the counter-majoritarian difficulty, see
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
(1980); and Charles E. Cohen, The Abstruse Science: Kelo, Lochner, and
Representation Reinforcement in the Public Use Debate, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 375
(2008). Lochnerism, therefore, is just a specific instance of the countermajoritarian difficulty.
93. See JOSEPH ALSOP & TURNER CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS (1938) (describing
the famous “switch in time that saves nine”); see also John M. Lawlor, Court
Packing Revisited: A Proposal for Rationalizing the Timing of Appointments to
the Supreme Court, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 974-75 (1986) (recounting court
packing plan, whereby FDR, frustrated by the United States Supreme Court’s
tendency to invalidate New Deal legislation, and bolstered by his landslide
victory in the 1936 presidential election, proposed to add an additional justice
for each sitting justice over seventy years of age who did not retire). But see THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 312 (David J. Danelski &
Joseph S. Tulchin eds., 1973) (“The President’s proposal had not the slightest
effect on our decision [in the West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish case].”).
94. For an excellent discussion of the simultaneous end of the Lochner era
and of the enforcement of the anti-favoritism norm in United States Supreme
Court jurisprudence, see State ex rel. Ohio County Commission v. Samol, 275
S.E.2d 2, 8 (W. Va. 1980) (Neely, C.J., concurring).
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The Court’s simultaneous retreat from both Lochnerism
and enforcement of the anti-favoritism norm is not
surprising, since both entail second-guessing of government
determinations. However, since Lochnerism is individualproperty-protecting, whereas the anti-favoritism norm is
general-public-protecting, the latter still warrants
heightened judicial protection, even if the former may not.
It is therefore not surprising that the anti-favoritism norm
has reemerged. Paradoxically, it has come back in the form
of the Court’s interpretation of the Federal Just
Compensation Clause.
The
private
property-protection
dimension
of
Lochnerism and the general public-protection dimension of
the anti-favoritism norm coincide in Just Compensation
Clause jurisprudence. In Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,95 the
Court held that a state statute prohibiting the mining of
coal underneath residences without leaving sufficient
support for the surface of the land was a prohibited taking
without just compensation of the coal owner’s right to mine
the coal. Justice Holmes, writing for the majority,
emphasized that the lawsuit involved “a single private
house,”96 thereby noting that the statute took property from
the coal company only to turn around and give it to the
individual surface residential landowner. In Pennsylvania
Coal, therefore, both the private-property-protection and
the anti-favoritism norms were violated.97
The Court confirmed the continued vitality of the antifavoritism norm in its 2005 decision Kelo v. City of New
London.98 Kelo arose in the context of private-benefit
expropriations, where private property is taken from party
A to be given to party B.99 In that setting, the private
95. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
96. Id. at 413.
97. Ironically, Justice Holmes, who wrote the majority opinion in
Pennsylvania Coal, also wrote the famous dissent in Lochner, in which he
warned that the Supreme Court’s invalidation of a New York statute that
limited the working hours of children constituted an improper intrusion by the
Court into the legislative arena. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
98. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
99. Id. at 477 (“[T]he sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole
purpose of transferring it to another private party B . . . . [in order to confer] a
private benefit on [party B].”).
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property protection norm is closely tied—indeed is followed
immediately by—enforcement of the anti-favoritism norm.
The Court held that when private property is expropriated
from an individual owner to be given to another private
party, such expropriation-plus-transfer-to-another-private
party must be in furtherance of a “public purpose.”100 As in
Pennsylvania Coal, the Court again enforced both the
private-property-protection norm and the anti-favoritism
norm.
Kelo, however, did not discuss how the rejuvenated antifavoritism norm would operate outside the direct
condemnation setting.101 In the direct condemnation setting
involved in Kelo, the government expropriates assets from a
particular owner, thereby triggering the private-propertyprotection norm of whether the expropriated party is being
subjected to unfair burdens. When the government then
seeks to transfer that particular asset to a specific or
identifiable private party, the anti-favoritism norm question
is thereby posed, and asks whether such subsequent
transfer would violate the anti-favoritism norm. However,
when the asset involved in a government transfer on a
favored basis is not concurrently acquired by the
government from a private party through direct
condemnation, but is instead already owned by the
government—and is proposed to be transferred to a specific
or identifiable private party—the anti-favoritism norm is
triggered independently of whether the expropriation from a
private party was appropriate. The anti-favoritism question
is the same, it just arises outside the setting of a
governmental direct condemnation.
The anti-favoritism norm is similarly independently
triggered in the other four settings identified in the
Introduction of this Article: (1) the award of a government
100. Id. at 480 (“The disposition of this case therefore turns on the question
whether the City’s development plan serves a “public purpose.”).
101. “Direct condemnation” involves government acquisition of property
through a forced purchase from the property owner, where the government
purposefully intends such expropriation and fully expects to pay just
compensation for it. MARTINEZ, GOVERNMENT TAKINGS, supra note 7, § 1:2. By
comparison, “non-direct condemnation” involves governmental conduct other the
government’s conscious and purposeful exercise of the power of eminent domain,
but whereby property is detrimentally affected to such an extent that the owner
is entitled to a remedy for the harm. Id. § 1:3.
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contract on a favored basis; (2) government award of a grant
on a favored basis; (3) governmental regulatory conduct,
such as zoning, on a favored basis; and (4) government
favoritism in the siting of public infrastructure projects.
Indeed, the Kelo direct condemnation setting could be
viewed as merely a subset of one or more of these.102
The question in each of the four settings in which the
anti-favoritism norm is triggered then is starkly posed: are
the interests of the general public being violated by unfair
conferral of benefits that do not advance the general
welfare? Since that question was not involved in Kelo, the
Court did not elaborate on the outlines of a broader antifavoritism jurisprudence.103 The foundations and elements
of anti-favoritism doctrine, however, can be identified from
federal and state constitutional law.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF “ANTI-FAVORITISM”
LAW
A. Federal Constitution
The Federal Constitution’s Taxing and Spending, Just
Compensation, and Due Process Clauses impose an antifavoritism obligation on federal, state, and local
governments to recapture public funds or assets transferred
102. Thus, the anti-favoritism norm would be triggered in each of the following
direct-condemnation-followed-by-transfer-to-private party-scenarios: (1) the
subsequent transfer of the expropriated asset is awarded on a favored contract
basis, perhaps as a sole-source (as in the Storyrock example); (2) the subsequent
transfer of the expropriated asset is awarded on a favored basis on a favored
basis by grant; (3) the subsequent transfer of the expropriated asset is awarded
on a favored basis, accompanied by favorable zoning to allow the transferee to
exploit the use of the asset on a disproportionately favorable basis compared
with surrounding property; (4) the subsequent transfer of the expropriated asset
is accompanied by favored siting of a public infrastructure projects, such as the
construction of a stadium which will provide the transferee with customers to
enhance the commercial use of the transferred asset.
103. For an excellent discussion of the failure of the Court to develop a
workable standard of judicial review of such legislative action, see Daniel S.
Hafetz, Ferreting Out Favoritism: Bringing Pretext Claims After Kelo, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 3095 (2009). Popular resentment might have been motivated
by a more general change in attitudes toward the accumulation of great wealth
as a desirable moral principle. Cf. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Morality of
Money: American Attitudes Toward Wealth and the Income Tax, 70 IND. L.J. 119
(1994).
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to private parties for private purposes.104 Moreover, those
Clauses empower private parties to bring claims against the
government to enforce that obligation when the government
fails to do so.
1. Taxing and Spending Clause. The Taxing and
Spending Clause of the United States Constitution provides
that the federal government has the “Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises. . . and provide
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States.”105
In Citizens’ Savings & Loan Ass’n v. City of Topeka,106
the city had issued $100,000 worth of bonds expressly for
the purpose of using the proceeds to make a donation to a
private party, the King Wrought-Iron Bridge Manufacturing
and Iron-Works Company, to encourage the company to
establish a factory to build iron bridges in the city. The
principal and interest on the bonds was to be raised by
levying taxes on the city residents for that purpose. A state
statute purportedly authorized the issuance of the bonds
and the imposition of the taxes to repay them. Citizens’
Savings & Loan Association of Cleveland, a bondholder,
brought an action against the city to require payment of the
interest on the bonds. The Court held that the statute was
invalid because it purported to authorize the taking of “the
property of the citizen under the guise of taxation to pay
these bonds, and use it in aid of the enterprises of others
which are not of a public character, thus perverting the
right of taxation, which can only be exercised for a public
use, to the aid of individual interests and personal purposes
of profit and gain.”107 Accordingly, the Court held, that the
bonds were invalid contracts because they were promised to
104. These Clauses apply to federal, state, and local governments. E.g. Green
v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 238-39 (1920) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause imposes substantive content of Taxing and
Spending Clause prohibitions on state and local governments); Chi., Burlington
& Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) (holding that the Just
Compensation Clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause); Citizens’ Savings & Loan Ass’n v. City of
Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874) (finding that the Taxing and Spending
Clause applies to cities).
105. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.1.
106. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655.
107. Id. at 659.
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be repaid through taxation, and there was no authority to
tax for such private purposes.108
The Court’s opinion in Citizens’ Savings implemented
the “natural law” conception that “each branch of
government is confined to a sphere of authority defined by
the nature and function of that level and by the inherent
rights of citizens.”109 That conception, seeking to protect the
free market from governmental interference, subsequently
was overturned as Lochnerism. The Court’s decision in
Citizens’ Savings, however, also implemented the antifavoritism norm as a concern independent from the goal of
protection of the free market. The anti-favoritism norm
seeks protection of the public’s interest in preventing the
allocation of public funds or assets to private parties for
purely private purposes. That conception was not affected
by counter-Lochnerism.
2. Just Compensation Clause. The Federal Just
Compensation Clause also provides a foundation for
imposing an obligation on the federal government to seek
the return of property conferred on private parties for
private purposes.
There are two direct condemnation settings in which
the anti-favoritism norm comes into play. The first major
setting, in which the government keeps expropriated land
for its own use, has two subsets. In the first subset, in which
the government expropriates an entire parcel of land owned
by a property owner, it has long been established that the
government need only pay compensation that is “just,” in
that the property owner is left no worse off—but also no

108. Id. at 660. See generally SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW, supra note 7, § 26:3 n.20 (collecting cases differentiating
between permissible public expenditures for public purposes and impermissible
public expenditures for private purposes).
109. The initial mention in the United States Supreme Court of the “natural
law” conception that government does not have the power to take property from
A to give it to B arose in dictum in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388
(1798). See State ex rel. Ohio County Comm’n v. Samol, 275 S.E.2d 2, 8 (W. Va.
1980) (Neely, C.J., concurring) (discussing the natural law conception as
underlying the Citizens’ Loan decision); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 560-61 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing Calder v. Bull as the most
notable early example of the concept that governmental authority is subject to
unwritten limits that preserve private autonomy).
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better off—than if the condemnation had not occurred.110
Thus, the prohibition of over-compensation implements the
anti-favoritism norm: the owner should not be singled out
for preferential treatment at the taxpayers’ expense based
on the fortuity that his or her land was taken.
In the second subset, in which the government
expropriates on a portion of a parcel of land owned by a
property owner, (known as “partial takings”), is equally well
established that the property owner should not be overcompensated. Thus, “special benefits” accruing to the
remainder of the parcel of land as a result of the
government’s acquisition of the part taken are deducted
from the amount of compensation awarded for the value of
the part taken.111 Acknowledging that the deduction for
special benefits is protective of the public, and hence
implements the anti-favoritism norm, the United States
Supreme Court noted in Bauman v. Ross: “To award him
less would be unjust to him; to award him more would be
unjust to the public.”112
The second major direct condemnation setting also has
two subsets. In this major setting, the government purports
to exercise direct condemnation against a private property
owner, (whether to take all or part of the landowner’s parcel
of land), only to turn around and convey the land so taken
to another private party. If such re-transfer is for the
latter’s private purposes, then such action is a
condemnation for a “private use” and will be enjoined.113
The net effect is the same as if the government were forced
to re-acquire the asset involved: the conferral of the benefit
to the private party must be retrieved—although the asset
must then be returned to the private party from whom it
was initially expropriated. Again, the anti-favoritism norm
is implemented.
110. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574 (1897) (“He is entitled to receive the
value of what he has been deprived of, and no more.”).
111. See id. at 573 (“The power of congress, exercising the right of eminent
domain...to provide for the deduction of benefits from the compensation or
damages for taking part of a parcel of land and injuring the rest, does not
appear ever to have been judicially questioned . . . .”).
112. Id. at 574.
113. See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) (“A purely
private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it
would serve no legitimate purpose of government and would thus be void.”).
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There is a close relationship between the prohibition
against the use of taxing and spending powers for private
purposes and the Just Compensation Clause prohibition
against takings for private purposes. The Court in Citizens’
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of Topeka,114 noted that taxation
had been previously used to repay bonds issued to assist
railroads, but that in those settings, the public interest in
transportation and the highly regulated character of
railroads might have warranted the conclusion that such
taxation was for a public purpose.115 The Court went on to
invalidate the issuance of $100,000 worth of bonds used to
make a donation to a private bridge company seeking to
encourage the company to build a factory in the city. The
Court held that levying taxes on the city residents to repay
the bonds was for a private, not a public purpose, and hence
violated the implied limitation on the power to tax that it be
used for a public purpose.
The reasoning of the Court in Citizens’ Savings is
remarkably similar to the Court’s reasoning in Kelo v. City
of New London116 on the question of “public use” in the
eminent domain setting. In Kelo, the issue was whether
private property was being appropriated by the government
for transfer to a private party for private purposes. All the
justices agreed that turning formerly private property over
to railroads was a quintessential “public use.”117 But the
justices disagreed on whether turning formerly private
property over to private developers for the building of a mall
was for a “public use.” The majority held that to be on the
“public use” side of the scale, the government’s
condemnation action must have originated from a
development plan which: (1) is comprehensive in character;
(2) was adopted after thorough deliberation; and (3) was not
adopted to benefit a particular class of identifiable
individuals.118
114. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 660-61 (1874).
115. Id. at 661-62.
116. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
117. Id. at 477 (“[T]he condemnation of land for a railroad with commoncarrier duties is a familiar example [of use by the public.]”); id. at 496 (“[T]he
government may take their homes to build a road or a railroad.”) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
118. Id. at 478, 483-84 (majority opinion).
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Justice Kennedy’s separate concurrence, the “swing”
vote, would have exercised more skeptical judicial review,
noting:
A court confronted with a plausible accusation of impermissible
favoritism to private parties should treat the objection as a serious
one and review the record to see if it has merit, though with the
presumption that the government’s actions were reasonable and
119
intended to serve a public purpose.

Justice O’Connor, dissenting, would have held that
governments may take land to transfer it to private
developers only if “the extraordinary, precondemnation use
of the targeted property inflicted affirmative harm on
society . . . .”120 Thus, she would have prohibited the
condemnation involved in Kelo.
Taxation constitutes a quintessential taking of private
property from citizens. General taxation involves fungible
money, however, not unique land, and is imposed generally
across the tax base, not on particular landowners. Similar
concerns about transferring formerly private property to
private parties arise, however, in the exercise of tax power
to obtain money that will then be given to private parties
for a private purpose. Thus, it should call for at least the
level of scrutiny that the majority in Kelo demanded in the
direct condemnation setting, or perhaps skeptical rational
basis judicial review, as Justice Kennedy suggested.121

119. Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 500 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
121. For discussion of the relation between the prohibition against takings for
private use and the prohibition against the conferral of public funds or assets for
private purposes, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 61, 68-69 (1986).
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3. Due Process Clause. In Green v. Frazier,122 the United
States Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause imposes the substantive
content of the Taxing and Spending Clauses on state and
local governments. The Court noted that although the Due
Process Clause “contains no specific limitation upon the
right of taxation in the States, . . . it has come to be settled
that the authority of the States to tax does not include the
right to impose taxes for merely private purposes.”123
B. State Constitutions
State constitutions contain numerous provisions which
embody the anti-favoritism norm. Such provisions have
historically been interpreted to confer both an individual
right and a governmental obligation to seek recapture of
public funds or assets transferred to private parties in
violation of the anti-favoritism norm.124
122. Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 238-39 (1920).
123. Id. at 238.
124. Article IV, section 4, of the Federal Constitution, known as the “Guaranty
Clause,” provides that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. Federal
courts, however, have no power to enforce the clause, since the United States
Supreme Court has held that the issue is a nonjusticiable political question.
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S.
(21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (holding that women may be denied the vote), abrogated by
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
State courts, on the other hand, do have power to enforce the Guaranty
Clause. Kadderly v. City of Portland, 74 P. 710, 719-20 (Or. 1903) (lawmaking
by voters through initiative is compatible with Guaranty Clause requirement of
republican form of government because initiated laws “may be amended or
repealed by the Legislature at will” and “are subject to the same constitutional
limitations as other statutes”); see Ex parte Wagner, 95 P. 435 (Okla. 1908); In
re Pfahler, 88 P. 270, 273 (Cal. 1906) (initiative power in city charter for strictly
local affairs is consistent with Guaranty Clause).
The Guaranty Clause is not a viable basis for the implementation of the
anti-favoritism norm, however, for two fundamental reasons. First, there is a
problem with determining exactly what the Clause means. See Julian N. Eule,
Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503 (1990) (rethinking the
“counter-majoritarian difficulty” entailed in judicial review of popular
legislation); Hans A. Linde, Practicing Theory: The Forgotten Law of Initiative
Lawmaking, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1735, 1746-48 (1998); Hans A. Linde, When
Initiative Lawmaking is Not “Republican Government”: The Campaign Against
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1. State Taxing and Spending Clauses. State
constitutional taxing and spending clauses have been
interpreted by state courts to impose prohibitions against
the expenditure of public funds or assets to private parties
for private purposes.
For example, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that an
appropriation intended to compensate private parties
injured through tortious acts of the state’s agents, and for
which the state otherwise would have been immune, was
invalid as an improper gift of public property to private
persons for private purposes. The court noted:
It is well recognized that the power to levy and collect taxes and
the power to appropriate public funds are coexistent and rest upon
the same principle. If a tax cannot be levied for a particular
purpose, no appropriation of public money can be made for such
purpose. [citation omitted] It is also well settled that taxes cannot
be levied and collected, or an appropriation made, for other than a
public purpose or in furtherance of the public welfare, and that
any attempt so to do is a violation of the implied limitations of the
Constitution.125

Similarly, the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted that the
taxing and spending powers are inherently limited to
public, not private, purposes.126 The Oklahoma Legislature
had passed a resolution purporting to order the state
highway commission to pay a claim of $5000 to Mrs. Bland
for the death of her husband, a former employee of the
highway department, whose death resulted from an injury
he suffered while attempting to push a state-owned
automobile. The court noted that the resolution, not being a
statute, was of no force and effect,127 and moreover, that
even as a statute, it would have been an invalid special law.
However, the court based its decision on the central point
Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19, 22-24 (1993); David Schuman, The Origin of
State Constitutional Direct Democracy: William Simon, U’Ren and “The Oregon
System,” 67 TEMPLE L. REV. 947, 957 (1994). Second, there are more specific
clauses in state constitutions that provide a more solid foundation for
implementation of the anti-favoritism norm, as discussed next in this Article.
125. State ex rel. Walton v. Parsons, 80 P.2d 20, 22 (Idaho 1938).
126. Hawks v. Bland, 9 P.2d 720 (Okla. 1932).
127. This part of the opinion was subsequently overruled in Board of
Commissioners of Marshall County v. Shaw, 182 P.2d 507, 513 (Okla. 1947),
which held that a resolution sufficed as a state law.
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that such a payment would have been a “gift of public
money for private purposes.”128 The court explained:
To justify any exercise of [the power to tax and spend] . . . the
expenditure . . . must be for some public service, or some object
which concerns the public welfare. This principle . . . is
fundamental and underlies all government that is based on reason
129
rather than force.

An early case interpreting the state’s taxing and
spending provisions as inherently limited to public, not
private, purposes is McClelland v. State ex rel. Speer,130 in
which the state sued Wayne Township for a writ of mandate
to enforce a state statute requiring the town to lay a tax to
reimburse one William H. Speer for money he lost while
serving as trustee for the township. In denying the writ, and
voiding the statute, the Indiana Supreme Court concluded
that “[r]aising the funds for that purpose from the various
taxpayers of Wayne township, by tax, would be in effect
taking the property of one man to bestow it upon another. . .
. [T]he donation . . . cannot be regarded as a public use of
money.”131
Similarly, in Beach v. Bradstreet,132 the Connecticut
Supreme Court similarly invalidated a state statute
purporting to authorize a payment to widows and orphans
of the Civil War, on the ground that such payments
constituted taxation and spending for private purposes.
Perhaps exaggerating somewhat, the court concluded that
“[a] public purpose is indispensable to a legitimate exercise
of the taxing power; ‘though the people support the
government, the government should not support the
people.’”133

128. Hawks, 9 P.2d at 722.
129. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
130. 37 N.E. 1089 (Ind. 1894).
131. Id. at 1092-93 (citing cases from numerous other states for the same
proposition).
132. 82 A. 1030 (Conn. 1912).
133. Id. at 1035 (quoting Kingman v. Brockton, 26 N.E. 998 (Mass. 1891)).
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2. State Just Compensation Clauses. State just
compensation clauses also impose obligations on state and
local governments to seek the return of property conferred
on private parties for private purposes. As under the
Federal Just Compensation Clause, there are two major
direct condemnation settings in which the anti-favoritism
norm is implemented.
In the first major setting, the government expropriates
property from an owner and the government keeps the
property for its own use. In the first subset of that setting, if
an entire parcel of land is taken, the property owner is
entitled only to “just” compensation to make the owner
whole, and not more.134 In the second subset of that setting,
it has long been established under state just compensation
clauses, as under the Federal Just Compensation Clause,
that when the government has only taken part of a parcel of
land, the special benefits accruing to the remainder as a
result of the government’s acquisition of the part taken are
deducted from the amount of compensation awarded for the
value of the part taken.135 For example, in Town of Flower
Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. Partnership,136 the Town
required a subdivision developer to improve abutting streets
that did not meet specified standards, even though the
improvements were not necessary to accommodate the
impact of the subdivision. The Texas Supreme Court held
that the requirement constituted a taking because the Town
had failed to show the required improvements bore any
relationship to the impact of the Stafford Estates
development on the abutting road or on the Town’s roadway
system as a whole. However, the court further held that in
determining whether a taking had occurred, the costs of the
exaction (in the form of the improvements required) had to
be reduced by the “special benefits” accruing to the
landowner from the improvements of the road by the
Town.137 A special benefit is one going beyond the general

134. See generally SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW,
supra note 7, § 21:31 (discussing just compensation).
135. See generally id. § 21:39 (discussing partial takings).
136. 135 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. 2004).
137. Id. at 627-28.
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benefit supposed to diffuse itself from the improvement
through the municipality.”138
In the second major direct condemnation setting, where
a state or local government purports to exercise direct
condemnation against a private property owner, only to
turn around and convey the same asset to another private
party for the latter’s private purposes, such action is a
condemnation for a “private use” that will be enjoined.139
The net effect is the same as if the government were forced
to re-acquire the asset involved: the conferral of the benefit
to the private party must be retrieved—albeit the asset
must then be returned to the initial private party from
whom it was taken. Nevertheless, the anti-favoritism norm
is implemented.
3. State Due Process Clauses. Since the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Green v. Frazier,140 in which
the Court held the Federal Due Process Clause prohibits
state and local governments from transferring public funds
or assets to private parties for private purposes, state courts
have seen little need to develop their state due process
clauses to impose a similar prohibition. Thus, state courts
have uniformly held that even if state law (constitutional or
statutory) allowed such exercise of power, it would be
invalid under the Federal Due Process Clause.141 Moreover,
138. Id. at 627 n.34 (quoting Haynes v. City of Abilene, 659 S.W.2d 638, 64142 (Tex. 1983)). The Court held, however, that the Town had failed to prove such
benefits had indeed accrued.
139. See, e.g., County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 769-70 (Mich.
2004); Bailey v. Myers, 76 P.3d 898, 899 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); see also Everson
v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 44 A.2d 333, 337 (N.J. 1945) (holding that a
statute authorizing school district boards of education to contract for
transportation of children to and from schools, including other than public
schools, is not unconstitutional as providing expenditure of public moneys for
private purposes and construing New Jersey Just Compensation Clause, N.J.
CONST. art. I, ¶ 20).
140. Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 238-39 (1920).
141. See, e.g., State v. Miami Beach Redevelopment Agency, 392 So. 2d 875,
885 n.2 (Fla. 1980) (“However, a project to be financed by bonds payable from
taxation, undertaken by the state or a political subdivision, and serving a purely
private purpose, would be impermissible under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”), rev’d on other
grounds, Strand v. Escambia County, 992 So.2d 150 (Fla. 2008); People ex rel.
City of Urbana v. Paley, 368 N.E.2d 915, 918, (Ill. 1977) (“It has long been held
that the imposition of a tax for other than a public purpose constitutes a

2010]

GETTING BACK THE PUBLIC’S MONEY

653

there are numerous uniquely state constitutional
prohibitions on government favoritism that make
development of state due process clauses for the same
purpose unnecessary.
4. Uniquely State Constitutional Prohibitions. States
are truly the social and political “laboratories” of our
democracy where new and different ways of addressing
major social problems are developed.142 Although state
constitutional law scholars have long argued that litigants
should look to state constitutions as sources of substantive
rights independent of federal rights, only the most
adventuresome or imaginative seem to take advantage of
the opportunity.143
In the field of anti-favoritism law, it is particularly
important to look to state constitutional law, since states
were the first to confront the problem of favoritism by
government in a systematic way through specific state
constitutional prohibitions.
a. Gifts of Public Funds or Assets for Private Purposes.
State constitutions contain express prohibitions against
gifts of public funds or assets for private purposes.144 Most
violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal
Constitution, and of the Illinois Constitution of 1870.” (citations omitted)).
142. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
143. See, e.g., JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES § 1.03 (4th ed. 2006) (discussing why
the logical and tactical reasons to rely on state law and state constitutions for
the development of federal rights).
144. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 6 (“The Legislature shall have no power
to . . . make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any public money or
thing of value to any individual, municipal or other corporation whatever[.]”);
N.Y. CONST. art. 7, § 8 (“The money of the state shall not be given or loaned to or
in aid of any private corporation or association, or private undertaking[.]”);
WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 5 (“The credit of the state shall not, in any manner be
given or loaned to, or in aid of, any individual, association, company or
corporation.”); id. § 7 (“No county, city, town or other municipal corporation
shall hereafter give any money, or property . . . to . . . any individual,
association, company or corporation . . . .”); Sturgeon v. County of L.A., 84 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 242, 248 (Ct. App. 2008) (“By its terms, article XVI, section 6 prevents
the Legislature from making or authorizing any gift of public funds for private
purposes.”); Teachers Ass’n, Cent. High Sch. Dist. No. 3 v. Bd. of Educ., Cent.
High Sch. Dist. No. 3, Nassau County, 312 N.Y.S.2d 252 (App. Div. 1970)
(holding that a state constitutional prohibition against the gift of public funds or
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courts, however, uphold the transfer of public funds or
assets to private parties as long some minimal public
purpose is served.145 Some courts go further and require
that even if a minimal public purpose is served, there must
be adequate consideration provided to the government in
exchange.146 One reported decision focused narrowly on the
adequacy (or lack thereof) of the consideration received by
the government, in which a 99-year lease of 110 acres of
city-owned land was conveyed for $1 a year to a private
entity for construction of a major league baseball spring
training complex.147
Alaska, uniquely among the states,148 has a
constitutional prohibition against payment of public funds
assets for private purposes was intended to curb raids on public purse for
benefit of favored individuals or enterprises furnishing no corresponding benefit
or consideration to state); CLEAN v. State, 928 P.2d 1054, 1061 (Wash. 1996)
(holding that two provisions, although worded differently, have identical
meaning and manifest purpose is to prevent public funds from being used to
benefit private interests where the public interest is not primarily served).
145. See SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra note 7,
§ 3.12 n.16 (collecting cases on state constitutional prohibition against local
government gifts of public funds); id. § 21:7 n.11 (collecting cases on state
constitutional prohibition against local government conveying public property to
private party without adequate consideration).
146. See, e.g., CLEAN, 928 P.2d at 1061-62 (using a two-prong test where the
court first asks if expenditure is for fundamental purpose of government, and if
so, then no improper gift of public funds is found; if not, court then focuses on
the consideration received by the public for the expenditure of public funds and
the donative intent of the appropriating body; court finds construction of a
baseball stadium was not a “fundamental purpose of the government,” but that
since stadium would be owned by the state, no improper gift was involved); see
also Price Dev. Co., v. Orem City, 2000 UT 26, ¶ 26, 995 P.2d 1237, 1246
(holding that a public entity must receive adequate consideration in exchange
for public property transferred to private parties and construing UTAH CONST.
art XIV, §3 and UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-2). “‘Adequate consideration’ means that
the . . . government must show that there is a clear ‘present benefit that reflects
. . . fair market value’ for whatever is given by the . . . government.” Id. ¶ 26,
995 P.2d at 1247 (citations omitted).
147. City of Tempe v. Pilot Properties, Inc., 527 P.2d 515 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974)
(reversing summary judgment for city on ground that material issue of fact
existed regarding whether city’s 99-year lease of 110 acres of city-owned land for
major league baseball spring training complex at annual rental of $1 per year
was adequate consideration).
148. Other states prohibit “support” to private schools. See, e.g., MO. CONST.
art. IX, § 8.
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“for the direct benefit of any . . . private educational
institution.”149 In Sheldon Jackson College v. State,150 the
Alaska Supreme Court held that the state’s tuition grant
program, which awarded Alaska residents attending private
colleges in Alaska an amount generally equal to the
difference between the tuition charged by the student’s
private college and the tuition charged by a public college in
the same area, not to exceed $2500 annually, violated the
“direct benefit” prohibition.151
The Alaska Supreme Court set out four criteria to guide
interpretation of the constitutional prohibition. First, the
court noted that as long as private schools were not singled
out for special treatment, provision of generally available
services such as police and fire protection, although
benefitting private schools, were not prohibited.152 Second,
the court noted that the nature of the use to which the
public funds were put mattered: if the use of the money was
for the essentially private functions of the schools, it was
prohibited; but if the use of the money benefited the general
health and welfare of the students, it was allowed.153
Significantly, the court noted in passing that a “substantial
question” was raised about a prior decision in which the
court had invalidated a statute enabling private school
children living far from schools to ride public school buses at
public expense.154 Presumably, such assistance would fall on
the general health and welfare, not the essentially private
function side of the line and would be permitted.
Third, the court emphasized that a court must consider
the relative magnitude of the benefit conferred: “[a] trivial,
though direct, benefit may not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation, whereas a substantial, though
arguably indirect, benefit may.”155 Fourth, the court noted
that merely channeling the funds through an intermediary

149. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1.
150. Sheldon Jackson College v. State, 599 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1979).
151. Ariz. Stat. § 14.40.776(a); Sheldon Jackson College, 599 P.2d at 128.
152. Sheldon Jackson College, 599 P.2d at 130.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 130 n.20.
155. Id. at 130.
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did not remove the “direct benefit” character of an improper
expenditure.156
Applying these factors, the Alaska Supreme Court held:
(1) private colleges and their students were singled out for
benefits under the tuition grant program; (2) although
education in general is a general health and welfare
concern, the tuition program specifically targeted private
school education, which is by definition a private activity;
(3) in 1975-76, Sheldon Jackson College alone received
approximately six hundred thousand dollars through the
program, clearly a substantial amount; and (4) although the
funds were nominally paid to the students, each student
was merely a conduit for provision of the funds to the
private colleges.157
The Alaska Supreme Court’s approach—requiring
something more than an after-the-fact rationalization that
governmental transfer of public funds or assets to private
parties serves a public purpose—is by far in the minority.158
The overwhelming majority rule is that the gift of public
funds prohibition across the country is a paper tiger.159
b. Lending of Public Credit. The lending of public credit
occurs when the government agrees to place itself in the
position of a surety.160 When the government places itself in
the position of a surety in regard to private debts or
obligations, however, there is the potential for violating the
anti-favoritism norm. Instead of a transfer of public funds
or assets, such lending of public credit pledges the
government’s funds to satisfy private debts contingent on
the failure of the private party to pay them. Since no public
money is immediately spent, governments are tempted to
156. Id. at 130-31.
157. Id. at 131-32.
158. See generally Briffault, supra note 17, at 910-15 (reviewing demise of
“public purpose” requirement as a brake on state and local government transfer
of public funds or assets to private parties).
159. See id. at 914 (“Today, state constitutional ‘public purpose’ requirements
are largely rhetorical.”).
160. See generally id. at 910-15; Arthur P. Roy, Comment, State Constitutional
Provisions Prohibiting the Loaning of Credit to Private Enterprise - A Suggested
Analysis, 41 U. COLO. L. REV. 135, 140-43 (1969); see also SANDS, LIBONATI &
MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra note 7, § 25:7 (restrictions on the
lending of public credit).
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over-commit the public treasury by acting as surety for
more and more contingent obligations. During the
nineteenth century state and local governments engaged in
widespread lending of public credit to private railroads and
other private enterprises, with disastrous consequences:
when many such private enterprises failed during the
depression of 1837, the government—and thus the
taxpayers—were liable for huge debts.161 As a result, almost
all state constitutions were amended to prohibit the lending
of public credit for private purposes.162
“Lending of credit” prohibitions,163 like their close
cousins, the prohibitions against the subscription to private
stock,164 are practically meaningless as constraints on
government conduct favoring private parties for purely
private purposes. If the government is not in a position of a
surety, no “lending of credit” is involved.165 Thus, loans or
outright grants are not covered.166 Even if the government
has placed itself in the position of a surety for a private
party, if the government’s purpose is to invest for its own
benefit, rather than for the benefit of the private party, the
prohibition does not apply.167

161. See Briffault, supra note 17, at 910-15 (2003) (discussing disastrous
consequences of ill-advised lending of credit by state and local governments).
162. See, e.g., IDAHO CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (“The credit of the state shall not, in
any manner, be given, or loaned to, or in aid of any individual, association,
municipality or corporation.”); UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 29, cl. 1 (“Neither the
State nor any county, city, town, school district, or other political subdivision of
the State may lend its credit . . . in aid of any private individual or corporate
enterprise or undertaking.”). See generally Roy, supra note 160, at 136-37 n.8
(citing forty-five state constitutional provisions).
163. See Utah Tech. Fin. Corp. v. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d 406, 409-11 (Utah
1986).
164. See generally Briffault, supra note 17, at 910-15; Roy, supra note 160, at
135-36.
165. See Utah Tech., 723 P.2d at 409-11.
166. See, e.g., id. (stating that loans or grants are not “lending of credit”).
167. See, e.g., id. at 409-10 (citing that in ninety years, the court reviewed
thirteen cases, and found none of them violated the “lending of credit”
prohibition in Utah); see also SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAW, supra note 7, § 25:7 (collecting cases illustrating that courts
overwhelmingly defer to government determination that a public purpose is
involved, and thus no lending of public credit for private purposes).

658

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

c. Private or Special Laws or Privileges. A typical
statement of the prohibition in state constitutions against
the enactment of “private or special laws or privileges” is as
follows: “No private or special law shall be enacted where a
general law can be applicable.”168 The purpose of the
prohibition against private or special laws or privileges in
state constitutions is to prevent singling out, of individuals
or particular groups, either for detrimental treatment or for
favorable treatment.169 The prohibition against private or
special laws or privileges is thus merely the opposite side of
the same coin from the “uniform laws” requirement in state
constitutions, which require that laws must be “general” in
that they apply similarly to all persons who are similarly
situated.170
The fundamental difficulty with “special laws”
prohibitions as a source of constraints on government
conduct conferring benefits on private parties for private
purposes on a favored basis, however, is that courts
uniformly defer to governmental identification of
governmental objectives as “public” and the conferral of
benefits on a particular private party as a “reasonable”
means for attaining those objectives.171 Thus, “special laws”
168. UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 26. For comprehensive treatment of “special laws”
provisions in state constitutions as they related to local governments and
private parties, see SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW,
supra note 7, §§ 3:21-3:36.
169. See Wood v. Budge, 374 P.2d 516, 519 (Utah 1962) (“It is an elementary
principle of justice that there should be ‘equal rights to all and special privileges
to none.’” (citation omitted)); see also Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Utah Ins.
Guaranty Ass’n, 564 P.2d 751, 754 (Utah 1977) (“One of the purposes of the
constitutional provisions prohibiting the creation or formation of corporations by
special acts was to remove the danger of favoritism and corruption in the
creation of corporations.”).
170. See, e.g., UTAH CONST. art I, § 24 (“All laws of a general nature shall have
uniform operation.”); ABCO Enters. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2009 UT 36,
¶ 15, 211 P.3d 382, 387 (Utah 2009) (“[Standard for ’uniform laws’ compliance
entails]: (1) whether the classification is reasonable; (2) whether the objective of
the legislative action is legitimate; and (4) whether there is a reasonable
relationship between the legislative purpose and the classification.”); see also
People v. W. Fruit Growers, 140 P.2d 13, 19-20 (Cal. 1943) (holding that a law is
“general” where it applies equally to all persons in a class, and is “special”
where it confers particular privileges or imposes peculiar burdens upon
similarly situated persons).
171. See, e.g. Savannah R-III Sch. Dist. v. Pub. Sch. Ret. Sys. of Mo., 950
S.W.2d 854, 859 (Mo. 1997) (applying rational basis test when reviewing

2010]

GETTING BACK THE PUBLIC’S MONEY

659

prohibitions do not seriously implement the anti-favoritism
norm.
IV. THE SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OF “ANTI-FAVORITISM” LEGAL
DOCTRINE
Although the anti-favoritism norm is present
throughout American property law, there is no effective
anti-favoritism
legal
doctrine
to
implement
it.
Implementation requires formulation of an appropriate
standard of judicial review which will embody antifavoritism legal doctrine.
A. Accountability in the Form of a Standard of Judicial
Review
“Accountability” is “the ability of one actor to demand
an explanation or justification of another actor for its
actions and to reward or punish that second actor on the
basis of its performance or its explanation.”172 Once the antifavoritism norm is established as a public value, the critical
condition to its realization is accountability.173 The
fundamental problem with current anti-favoritism legal
doctrine, however, is that it does not hold governments
accountable: transfers of public funds or assets to private
parties are, for all practical purposes, conclusively
presumed to be for public purposes. By default, reliance is
placed on the mythical accountability of governmental

legislation for compliance with special laws prohibition); State v. Mason, 78 P.2d
920, 924 (Utah 1938) (“If a reasonable basis to differentiate those included from
those excluded from its operation can be found, it must be held constitutional.”);
Laurels of Bon Air, LLC v. Med. Facilities of Am. LIV Ltd., 659 S.E.2d 561, 568
(Va. Ct. App. 2008) (“The special laws prohibitions recognize ‘the necessity for
and the reasonableness of classification are primarily questions for the
legislature. If any state of facts can be reasonably conceived, that would sustain
it, that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed.’”
(quoting Jefferson Green Unit Owners Ass’n v. Gwinn, 551 S.E.2d 339, 345
(2001))).
172. Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative
Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2073 (2005).
173. See MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS, PRIVATIZATION
PUBLIC GOOD 150 (2002).
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officials through elections.174 But why would the populace be
up in arms when public funds or assets are given to private
persons, (indeed, one of their own), for private purposes?175
Instead, as Martha Minow has noted, “society needs more
accessible and reliable measures to know when enterprises
are effective, what safeguards are in place against abuse,
waste and fraud—and whether they are working.”176
Judicial review of government conduct consists of a
court’s appraisal of whether a governmental agency or
official has acted properly. Judicial review is thus an
oversight process to ensure accountability.177 In order to
avoid the charge of Lochnerism, however, a standard of
judicial review to implement the anti-favoritism norm must
be carefully crafted to avoid judicial overreaching into the
legislative realm.
The criteria used by courts to evaluate government
conduct are contained in standards of judicial review.178
Standards for judicial review of government conduct may be
viewed as having a quantitative dimension—what materials
a reviewing court will examine—and a qualitative
dimension—how skeptically the court will consider such
materials. Both of those dimensions must be considered in
174. Rubin, supra note 172, at 2073 (“The first [myth] is . . . that elected
officials—legislators and the chief executive—are accountable to the people
. . . .”). For a critical reappraisal of judicial deference to legislative fact-finding,
see Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative FactFinding, 84 IND. L.J. 1, 1 (2009), who proposes a paradigm of selective
independent judicial review of social facts, whereby independently review the
factual foundation of legislation that curtails traditional and emerging
fundamental rights.
175. For an amusing study of the obliviousness of people in the face of
important choices, see RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 3, 5
(2009), who suggest that what people need are “choice architects” who will
organize “the context in which people make decisions” in order “to steer people’s
choices in directions that will improve their lives.”
176. MINOW, supra note 173, at 166.
177. See generally Rubin, supra note 172, at 2073 (“Accountability can be
roughly defined as the ability of one actor to demand an explanation or
justification of another actor for its actions and to reward or punish that second
actor on the basis of its performance or its explanation.”).
178. See generally SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW,
supra note 7, § 16:29.50 (suggesting framework for considering standards of
judicial review of local government and administrative action).
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characterizing a standard of judicial review as “deferential”
or “activist.” For example, a “deferential” standard of
judicial review’s quantitative dimension would not require
the government to tender any materials to a court to justify
the government’s conduct; the existence of such
justifications would be presumed to exist—or could be
imagined by a court to exist—after the fact. Similarly, the
qualitative dimension of a “deferential” standard would be
expressed generally as requiring only a “rational
relationship” between means and ends. On the other hand,
an “activist” standard of judicial review’s quantitative
dimension would require the government to tender
materials documenting that the objective the government
was seeking to achieve. And the qualitative dimension of an
“activist” standard would require the government to show it
was seeking a “compelling,” not merely “legitimate”
governmental interest, and that the means used was
“necessary” to its accomplishment.
Deferential standards of judicial review impose minimal
constraints on government conduct.179 Activist standards of
179. Hancock Industries v. Schaeffer, 811 F.2d 225, 237-38 (3d Cir. 1987) is
illustrative. With respect to identification of the ends sought to be achieved by
the governmental action:
The court accepts at face value contemporaneous declarations of
the legislative purposes, or, in the absence thereof, rationales
constructed after the fact, unless ‘an examination of the
circumstances forces [the court] to conclude that they could not
have been a goal of the legislation.’ Thus, where ‘there are
plausible reasons for [the [governmental]] action, [the court’s]
inquiry is at an end. It is, of course, constitutionally irrelevant
whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision.’
Id. at 237 (citations omitted). Similarly, with respect to the relation between the
objective and the means, the court continued:
[W]hen a court inquires whether the legislative action is rationally
related to achievement of the statutory purposes, it need not
decide whether the facts available to the legislature are more
likely than not true . . . . If the legislative determination that its
action will tend to serve a legitimate public purpose ‘is at least
debatable,’ the challenge to that action must fail as matter of law.
Id. at 238 (citations omitted). When a court inquires whether the legislative
action is rationally related to achievement of the statutory purposes, it need not
decide whether the facts available to the legislature are more likely than not
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judicial review, in contrast, are characterized by a judicial
tendency to second-guess the governmental entity involved.
Since the end of Lochnerism, whether deferential or activist
judicial review is triggered in any given situation depends
on the nature of the individual interests affected by the
governmental conduct in question: economic rights trigger
deferential judicial review; fundamental rights or suspect
traits trigger activist review.180 Implementation of the antifavoritism norm, therefore, depends on formulation of an
appropriate standard of judicial review that will embody
anti-favoritism legal doctrine.
B. Anti-favoritism Doctrine—Individual Rights and
Government Obligations
The anti-favoritism norm is a public protection concept
that transcends individual rights. However, individuals
must be able to prod the government when it refuses to
recapture funds or assets transferred in violation of the
anti-favoritism norm.
1. Individual Right to Seek Anti-favoritism Recapture—
A Proxy Individual Right. Individual rights traditionally
protect the interests of the individuals who hold them. They
true. As the Supreme Court explained in Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 110-11
(1979):
In ordinary civil litigation, the question frequently is which party
has shown that a disputed historical fact is more likely than not to
be true. In an equal protection case of this type, however, those
challenging the legislative judgment must convince the court that
the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based
could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental
decisionmaker.
Accordingly, it is not enough for one challenging a statute on equal
protection grounds to introduce evidence tending to support a conclusion
contrary to that reached by the legislature. If the legislative determination that
its action will tend to serve a legitimate public purpose “is at least debatable,”
the challenge to that action must fail as matter of law. United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938).
180. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (distinguishing between
activist judicial review, when fundamental rights or suspect traits are involved,
and deferential review, when property rights are affected by governmental
conduct).
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do not define governmental power, but instead address the
subsequent question of establishing limitations on
governmental power.181 In contrast, the individual right to
be free from governmental conduct in violation of the antifavoritism norm is held as a proxy for defining the power of
governments.
When the government exercises direct condemnation to
appropriate private property, the condemned owner has the
individual right to assert a claim that the particular
appropriation is not for a “public use.” In Kelo v. City of New
London,182 the majority held that to be a “public use,”
governmental appropriation of private land that is
subsequently conveyed to another private party must have
originated from a development plan which: (1) is
comprehensive in character; (2) was adopted after thorough
deliberation; and (3) was not adopted to benefit a particular
class of identifiable individuals.183 This constituted a fairly
deferential standard of judicial review. Although the burden
was placed on the government, that burden could be
satisfied fairly easily through the preparation of a carefully
prepared record. In contrast, Justice Kennedy in his
separate concurrence would have exercised a more skeptical
judicial review, noting that a reviewing court should
examine “the record to see if it has merit, though with the
presumption that the government’s actions were reasonable
and intended to serve a public purpose.”184
By comparison, some state courts have interpreted state
just compensation clauses to impose more activist standards
of judicial review in the direct condemnation settings. For
example, in County of Wayne v. Hathcock,185 the Michigan
Supreme Court held that a “public use” could only be shown
to exist:
(1) where ‘public necessity of the extreme sort’ requires collective
action; (2) where the property remains subject to public oversight
after transfer to a private entity; and (3) where the property is
181. SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra
note 7, § 6 (describing “power-limitation” construct).
182. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
183. See id. at 483-84.
184. Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
185. 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
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selected because of ‘facts of independent public significance,’
rather than the interests of the private entity to which the
property is eventually transferred.186

When an expropriated property owner successfully
challenges a direct condemnation as being for a non-public
use, that amounts to an “anti-favoritism” recapture. Thus,
such an individual right already has a built-in standard of
judicial
review:
deferential
under
Federal
Just
Compensation law; somewhat more activist under some
state just compensation provisions.
In the anti-favoritism setting, however, there may be no
specific, identifiable private asset that has been
expropriated by the government, as in the direct
condemnation setting. The “asset” bestowed on a private
party in the anti-favoritism setting—whether in the form of
public funds or assets—often has been acquired by the
government through taxation or other similar revenueraising governmental activity such as public fines or fees. In
the anti-favoritism setting as well, however, there is an
individual right to force the government to recapture public
funds or assets conferred on private parties for private
purposes.
The individual right in the anti-favoritism setting is the
right of autonomy—to be free from governmental conduct
that benefits only private parties for their own private
purposes.187 The Court’s opinion in Citizens’ Savings
implemented the “natural law” conception that “each
branch of government is confined to a sphere of authority
defined by the nature and function of that level and by the
inherent rights of citizens.”188 While that conception sought
186. Id. at 781, 783.
187. See generally Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV.
1410, 1410-11 (1974) (discussing the evolution in American law from protection
of the free market to protection of privacy and autonomy); Laurence H. Tribe,
Reflections on Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 483, 488 (2007)
(referring to the Citizens’ Savings case as representative of cases identifying
unenumerated rights).
188. State ex rel. Ohio County Comm’n v. Samol, 275 S.E.2d 2, 8 (W. Va. 1980)
(Neely, C.J., concurring). The initial mention of the “natural law” conception in
the United States Supreme Court that government acts improperly when it
“takes property from A. and gives it to B” arose in dictum in Calder v. Bull, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798). See TRIBE, supra note 109, at 560-61 (2d ed. 1988)
(discussing Calder v. Bull as the most notable early example of the concept that
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to protect the free market from governmental interference,
the Court’s decision in Citizens’ Savings also implements
the individual right to prevent government from exceeding
its authority through conferring public funds or assets on
private parties for private purposes.189 That individual right
is a tool whereby individuals can protect themselves and the
government against the tendency of factions to capture
governmental machinery—and public funds and assets—for
purely private purposes.190
The Court in Citizens’ Savings made clear that
governmental use of the powers to tax and spend for private
purposes constituted “an unauthorized invasion of private
right . . . [one of the] rights in every free government beyond
governmental authority is subject to unwritten limits that preserve private
autonomy).
189. Laurence Tribe refers to this as a natural rights conception defined
“reflexively,” in that such limits are “implied by the creation and character of
the legislature itself—that is, by the specific purposes for which legislatures
were created in the American states and by the means through which it was
supposed that such legislatures might accomplish their objectives.” TRIBE, supra
note 109, at 561. Another way of phrasing the constraint is to say that
government simply does not have the power under the circumstances—never
mind whether any particular limitation on that power arises from some other
source. See SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW,
supra note 7, § 6-7 (holding that first question is whether government has
“power,” second question is whether there is a “limitation” on that power).
190. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); Daryl J. Levinson, Framing
Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 1311, 1350-51 (2002)
(“[Madisonian notion about curtailing factions is] to prevent politically
efficacious factions from commandeering the legislature to redistribute wealth
and entitlements for no greater good than enriching themselves at others’
expense.”); Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 8, at 553 (“In the context of [antifavoritism], the [Madisonian] concern is that the faction will enrich itself from
the public purse at the expense of the unorganized public.); Cass R. Sunstein,
Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984) (nothing
that the Madisonian idea is to prevent interest groups that have successfully
captured the political process at the expense of other interest groups or
dispersed majorities to enrich themselves through “rent-seeking” behavior of
enriching themselves from public funds or assets); see also Jody Freeman, The
Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000) (debunking
public-private division and instead proposing a conception of governance as a set
of negotiated relationships whereby public and private actors negotiate over
policy making, implementation, and enforcement, thereby decentralizing the
decision-making process). See generally Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use”
Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale Based on Secret Purchases
and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2006).
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the control of the State.”191 The Court explained that such
right grew “out of the essential nature of all free
governments. Implied reservations of individual rights,
without which the social compact could not exist, and which
are respected by all governments entitled to the name.”192
The Court explained the fundamental principle as follows:
To lay with one hand the power of the government on the property
of the citizen, and with the other to bestow it upon favored
individuals to aid private enterprises and build up private
fortunes, is none the less a robbery because it is done under the
forms of law and is called taxation. This is not legislation. It is a
193
decree under legislative forms.

Citizens’ Savings thus makes clear that the individual
right to enforce recapture of public funds or assets
transferred in violation of the anti-favoritism norm is a
proxy for the general public’s interest.
2. Governmental Obligation to Seek Anti-favoritism
Recapture.
The
anti-favoritism
norm
obligates
governmental recapture of public funds or assets
transferred to private parties for private purposes. This is
evident from the origins of the norm in qui tam, public
trust, special assessment, and betterment fields, where
invalidation or recapture are the available remedies.
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the Taxing and Spending, Just Compensation, and Due
Process Clauses all call for invalidation of the transfer as
the available remedy.
Government obligation to seek anti-favoritism recapture
is also evident in the interpretation of state constitutional
provisions. It particularly well established in the “gift of
public funds” field.194 For example, in Johns v.
Wadsworth,195 the Washington Supreme Court found that a
county ordinance appropriating money to a private
191. Citizens’ Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 662,
(1874) (emphasis added).
192. Id. at 663.
193. Id. at 664.
194. See, e.g., CLEAN v. State, 928 P.2d 1054 (Wash. 1996) (showing that
declaratory and injunctive relief is the typical remedy used to enforce state
constitutional prohibition against gift of public funds).
195. Johns v. Wadsworth, 141 P. 892 (1914).

2010]

GETTING BACK THE PUBLIC’S MONEY

667

association to put on the Western Washington Fair was an
invalid gift.196 Although the appropriation was for a worthy
educational public purpose, the money went directly to
private association, the county maintained no direct control
over how the money was spent, and although any building
erected with the money would belong to the county, no
building was required to be constructed at all. The court
affirmed a judgment enjoining the issuance and payment of
the funds.197
3. A Suggested Anti-favoritism Recapture Standard of
Judicial Review. The United States Supreme Court in
Citizens’ Savings laid out the general policies to be
accomplished by a standard of judicial review in
determining whether the anti-favoritism norm has been
violated:
[I]n deciding whether, in the given case, the object for which the
taxes are assessed falls upon the one side or the other of this line,
they must be governed mainly by the course and usage of the
government, the objects for which taxes have been customarily
and by long course of legislation levied, what objects or purposes
have been considered necessary to the support and for the proper
use of the government, whether State or municipal. Whatever
lawfully pertains to this and is sanctioned by time and the
acquiescence of the people may well be held to belong to the public
use, and proper for the maintenance of good government, though
198
this may not be the only criterion of rightful taxation.

The Court invalidated the tax to pay off $100,000 worth
of city bonds, the proceeds of which were to be used to make
a donation to the King Wrought-Iron Bridge Manufacturing
and Iron-Works Company to encourage the company to
establish a factory to build iron bridges in the city. The
Court noted the slippery slope: “No line can be drawn in
favor of the manufacturer which would not open the coffers
of the public treasury to the importunities of two-thirds of
the business men of the city or town.”199
To implement the Court’s general admonitions, a
standard of judicial review must implement both the
196. Id. at 892-94.
197. Id. at 893-94.
198. Citizens’ Savings, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 665.
199. Id.
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individual right as well as the governmental obligation to
recapture funds or assets transferred in violation of the
anti-favoritism norm. Since the objective is not to protect
private property rights, the problem of Lochnerism is not
raised. However, since it is a court, after all, that will be
exercising judicial review over political bodies or officials,
the “counter-majoritarian difficulty” remains. The countermajoritarian difficulty is avoided, however, if the proposed
standard of judicial review is rooted in legal principle and
not in the personal preferences of judges.200
The following proposed standard of judicial review sets
out the legal principles to guide judges in determining
whether any particular201 transfer of public funds or assets
constitutes a violation of the anti-favoritism norm.202
1. Do the circumstances warrant judicial intervention as
a threshold matter?
a. Is the subsidy substantial or trivial in amount?203

200. See Harold Hongju Koh, A Community of Reason and Rights, 77 FORDHAM
L. REV. 583, 600 (2008). See generally Sunstein, supra note 190 (arguing that
open-ended constitutional provisions must be interpreted in a way that avoids
imposing the naked preferences of the judges making the decisions).
201. Cf. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (“No precise
mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of
individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in
nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.”); Levinson, supra
note 190, at 1385 (“Consequently, the best framing strategy for minimizing
redistributive rent-seeking might be to slice transactions narrowly, prohibiting
each isolated instance of redistribution.”).
202. The proposed standard is an aggregation of the factors set out in three
major sources: the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Federal
Just Compensation Clause in the direct condemnation setting in Kelo v. City of
New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005); the Michigan Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Michigan Just Compensation Clause in the direct
condemnation setting in County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich.
2004); and the Alaska Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Alaska
Constitution’s prohibition against payment of public funds “for the direct benefit
of any . . . private educational institution” in Sheldon Jackson College v. State,
599 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1979).
203. In the Storyrock example described at the outset of this article, the $5
million subsidy would seem to be a substantial amount, even though Senator
Bennett argued that it represents only .003 percent of the $154 billion defense
operating budget. Canham, supra note 4.
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b. Does the government receive significant monetary
consideration in return?204
c. Do the circumstances demonstrate that the
transaction is in good faith, not on a preferential favoritism
basis?205
2. Is there a controlling public purpose?
a. Is there a public purpose at all?206
b. Does the recipient’s activity have independent public
significance, analogous to a highway, railroad, canal or
other “instrumentalit[y] of commerce,” such that the
subsidy involved is unquestionably for a “public purpose”?207
c. Is the public purpose inherent in the recipient’s
activity the controlling public purpose for the subsidy, such
that the benefit to the private party is merely incidental?208
204. In the Storyrock example, the consideration returned is the provision of
the DVDs to the National Guard units. Id. If the DVDs have a fair market value
approximating $5 million, then significant consideration is received by the
government. See Price Dev. Co. v. Orem City, 2000 UT 26, ¶ 26, 995 P.2d 1237,
1247 (holding that public entity must receive adequate consideration in
exchange for public property transferred to private parties by construing UTAH
CONST. art XIV, §3 and UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-2). “‘Adequate consideration’
means that the . . . government must show that there is a clear ‘present benefit
that reflects . . . fair market value’ for whatever is given by the . . . government.”
Id. ¶ 26, 995 P.2d at 1247 (citations omitted).
205. The Storyrock earmark is clearly on a preferential favoritism basis, since
the whole point of earmarks is to favor a particular constituent individual or
group. See generally Kysar, supra note 21, at 534 (discussing operation of
earmarks, defined as “funds bestowed by Congress upon projects or programs by
specifying a narrow location or recipient, or without a competitive allocation
process.”); Andrew Woellner, Spending on an Empty Wallet: A Critique of Tax
Expenditures and the Current Fiscal Policy, 7 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 201, 226
(2006) (“[T]he term ‘earmark,’. . . is commonly used to mean spending projects
requested by individual members of Congress which are not open to competitive
bidding.”).
206. In the Storyrock example, Senator Bennett argued that the DVDs would
“be a moneymaker for the Defense Department, resulting in more reenlistments
and therefore less spending on recruiting new guardsmen and training them.”
Canham, supra note 4. This is certainly an articulable public purpose, but little
else.
207. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 782, 784. Storyrock’s production of DVDs would
not seem to have significance similar to such instrumentalities of commerce.
208. See id. at 783. The benefit to Storyrock is clearly more than incidental.
The lack of competitive bidding means the $5 million will accrue to Storyrock
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3. Is the subsidy indispensable for the private party’s
achievement of the public purpose?
That is, is the subsidy necessary because otherwise, the
operation of the free market would threaten the very
existence of the private enterprise involved or completely
block the private party from achieving the public
purpose?209
4. Are there factors indicating that public control over
the subsidy in the hands of the private party is retained by
the government, such as: (a) defeasible title, such that the
private party will lose title to the asset if it is no longer used
for the purpose for which eminent domain was exercised; or
(b) an enforceable agreement by the private party to use the
asset for the purpose for which eminent domain was
exercised; or (c) continuing public agency oversight and
direction of the use of the asset by the private party for the
purpose for which eminent domain was exercised?210
In addition to these factors, the quantitative dimension
of the proposed standard of judicial review would not
restrict a reviewing court to the legislative record, since
legislative bodies have a tendency to engage in selfvalidation.211 State legislatures and local government
alone, rather than to any other competitor in the market, since the whole point
of earmarks is to favor a particular constituent individual or group. See Kysar,
supra note 21, at 534 (“[Earmarks, by definition, are] funds bestowed by
Congress upon projects or programs by specifying a narrow location or recipient,
or without a competitive allocation process.”).
209. The achievement of the public purpose of encouraging reenlistments and
reducing spending on recruiting and training of National Guardsmen through
the award of $5 million on a noncompetitive basis to Storyrock seems
questionable. Senator Bennett only provided a small survey of 125 National
Guardsmen—conducted by Storyrock in 2007—which Storyrock said showed
that 63% of the guardsmen were more likely to reenlist after viewing the DVD’s
and 72% said their families also would be more supportive of such reenlistment
after viewing the DVDs. Canham, supra note 4.
210. There was no indication that Congress would retain any control over the
Storyrock award, other than presumably otherwise applicable federal contract
procurement requirements.
211. See generally Borgmann, supra note 174, at 1 (proposing a paradigm of
selective independent judicial review of social facts, whereby independently
review the factual foundation of legislation that curtails traditional and
emerging fundamental rights); Kysar, supra note 21, at 522 (discussing how the
House and Senate earmark rules are “self-referential,” in that they are “rules
adopted by the foxes to govern administration of the henhouse”).
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legislative bodies, in particular, usually don’t even bother to
prepare a validating legislative record at all.212
The qualitative dimension of the proposed standard of
judicial review would track Justice Kennedy’s separate
concurrence in Kelo, in which he proposed a more skeptical
rational basis judicial review, noting:
A court confronted with a plausible accusation of
impermissible favoritism to private parties should treat the
objection as a serious one and review the record to see if it
has merit, though with the presumption that the
government’s actions were reasonable and intended to serve
a public purpose.213
Such a combination of factors, quantitative and
qualitative dimensions would strike a proper balance
between enforcement of the anti-favoritism norm and
proper judicial deference to legislative and political bodies
and officials.
V. POTENTIAL ISSUES REGARDING “ANTI-FAVORITISM” CLAIMS
This part addresses several issues that should be
considered as anti-favoritism law is developed.

In the Storyrock example, a reviewing court could examine whether the
$5 million earmark contract was awarded purely on a favoritism basis, to
benefit Storyrock, rather than the public in general.
212. See John Martinez, Rational Legislating, 34 STETSON L. REV. 547 (2005)
(proposing that legislative bodies should be required to prepare a legislative
record showing the path from evidence, to findings, to conclusions).
In the Storyrock example, no background information regarding the
public purpose was provided until the story broke in the media. Neither the
House nor Senate rules on earmarks require such information. See Kysar, supra
note 21, at 537-42 (describing House and Senate earmark rules).
213. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 491, (2005) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). In the Storyrock example, a reviewing court could skeptically
consider whether, even if the public purposes of encouraging reenlistment and
reducing training costs of National Guardsmen are involved, the means of
awarding $5 million to Storyrock on a noncompetitive basis is a reasonable
means to accomplish that objective. Such skeptical review might conclude
otherwise.
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A. Standing
Courts of equity historically recognized taxpayers’
standing to challenge government conduct in order to
vindicate the taxpayers’ pecuniary interest in preventing
waste or unlawful use of public funds or property, to protect
the taxpayers’ interest as a cestui que trust against breach
of the public trust imposed on public funds or property, and
in recognition of the public law equivalent of the
stockholder’s derivative class action challenging unlawful
management of the affairs of a governmental entity.214
Similarly, taxpayer status should suffice to confer
standing to challenge governmental conduct allegedly in
violation of the anti-favoritism norm and legal doctrine put
forth in this Article. The United States Supreme Court has
directly addressed—and greatly encouraged—taxpayer
standing in the anti-favoritism setting.215 In Vermont
Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel.
Stevens,216 the Court held that although a qui tam relator
asserting a claim under the Federal False Claims Act217 did
not have standing based on his quest for a bounty in the
form of a portion of the government’s recovery, the relator

214. See generally SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW,
supra note 7, § 29:7 (taxpayer’s actions).
215. Outside the anti-favoritism setting—where litigants press merely a
“generalized grievance” about government operations—the Court has been
much less receptive to taxpayer standing. See United States v. Richardson, 418
U.S. 166, 174 (1974) (“[A] taxpayer may not ‘employ a federal court as a forum
in which to air his generalized grievances about the conduct of government or
the allocation of power in the Federal System.’” (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 114 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring))); see also Hein v. Freedom From
Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (limiting the Flast test for taxpayer
standing); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 448 (1923) (“The party who
invokes the power must be able to show, not only that the statute is invalid, but
that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct
injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some
indefinite way in common with people generally.”).
216. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
217. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (Supp. 2009). For discussion of the Federal False
Claims Act, see SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra
note 7, § 29:9, discussing qui tam actions.
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nevertheless had “representational standing,” as a partial
assignee of the government’s claim for recovery.218
States have developed the “remedial-preventative”
distinction for taxpayer standing. Under that approach, a
taxpayer seeking “remedial” relief, individual to the
taxpayer, must show special individualized injury, whereas
a taxpayer seeking “preventative” relief, to prevent
governmental action detrimental to the general community,
has standing to do so without a further showing.21219 For
example, in Lehigh v. Pittston Co.,220 the Maine Supreme
Court held that taxpayers sought “preventative” relief in
seeking to prevent the sale of a city airport to a private
company.221 The court held that the proposed sale was void
because it was illegal as contrary to federal statutes and
grant contracts under which federal funding for
construction of the airport had been provided222 and that it
was also against public policy because the airport was still
dedicated to public use.223 The court distinguished an earlier
case, Eaton v. Thayer,224 in which the court had held that a
suit for restitution of funds illegally paid from treasury had
been termed “remedial,” but even in Eaton, the court had
held that it had “full jurisdiction . . . but that the proceeding
should be instituted by the Attorney General, not by
individual [taxpayers].”225 Taxpayers therefore should have
standing to enforce the anti-favoritism norm in either
federal or state courts.

218. Vt. Agency of Natural Res., 529 U.S. at 773 n.4 (“More precisely, we are
asserting that a qui tam relator is, in effect, suing as a partial assignee of the
United States.”).
219. See, McCorkle v. Town of Falmouth, 529 A.2d 337 (Me. 1987) (holding
that a plaintiff challenging counting of ballots in bond election seeks preventive,
not remedial relief, and therefore has standing). See generally SANDS, LIBONATI
& MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra note 7, § 25:15 (remedies in the
local government borrowing setting).
220. Lehigh v. Pittston Co., 456 A.2d 355 (Me. 1983).
221. Id. at 359.
222. Id. at 360, 362.
223. Id. at 361.
224. Eaton v. Thayer, 128 A. 475 (Me. 1925).
225. Id. at 476.
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B. Encouraging Suits and Discouraging Abuse
Suits enforcing the anti-favoritism norm should be
encouraged, but there is always the danger of abuse which
must be addressed. This requires a balance between
encouraging suits and discouraging abuse.
Incentives to encourage litigation in the Federa False
Claims Act,226 provide a useful model. Thus, a qui tam
relator under the Act will generally be entitled to receive a
share of the government’s recovery, which ranges from 15%
to 25% if the United States has intervened,227 or from 25%
to 30% if it has not.228 The qui tam relator’s award is paid
only from “the proceeds” of the suit, which may consist of an
adjudicated amount or a settlement amount.229
Disincentives are needed to discourage abusive
practices, such as litigation purely for political reasons and
without foundation. Indeed, early qui tam statutes in
England, aptly termed “informer” statues, were ultimately
repealed because of abuses such as collusive use of qui tam
suits to allow a wrongdoer to avoid a penalty, or the
bringing of qui tam suits to prosecute obsolete violations.230
A disincentive such as allowing the prevailing governmental
entity in an anti-favoritism suit to recover its costs and
attorney fees, such recovery perhaps limited to the lesser of
actual costs and attorney fees or the sum of ten-thousand
dollars, might suffice to prevent such abuses.231
C. Notice of Anti-favoritism Claim
“Claimants seeking to sue the government in tort first
must file a notice of claim that sets out the surrounding
events and the relief sought.”232 The fundamental policy
226. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (Supp. 2009).
227. Id. § 3730(d)(1).
228. Id. § 3730(d)(2).
229. Id. §§ 3730(d)(1), (2).
230. Note, supra note 26, at 89.
231. See Martinez, supra note 212, at 620 (proposing a similar provision to
curb abuse in suits against legislation enacted without record of evidence,
findings and conclusions).
232. See generally SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW,
supra note 7, § 27:27 (Notice of Claim); John Martinez, Hurry Up and Wait:
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underpinning the notice of claim requirement is that
governments should be given the opportunity to correct
their errors before courts are called upon to intervene.
Accordingly, litigants asserting anti-favoritism claims
should be required to submit a “Notice of Anti-favoritism
Claim” to the governmental agency or official involved
before resorting to such courts for judicial adjudication.
Such Notice would begin the process whereby the
governmental agency or official involved determines
whether the government should recapture the public funds
or assets involved. Once the government has been given an
appropriate time to act, such as sixty days as provided in
the Federal False Claims Act,233 the anti-favoritism litigant
should be free to proceed to court.
D. No Jury Trial
Since an anti-favoritism action stems from the equitable
concern that government refrain from conferring special
benefits on private parties for private purposes, there is
probably no Seventh Amendment right to jury trial.234
Moreover, in purely practical terms, the sophisticated
understanding required to determine whether any
particular governmental transfer indeed violates the antifavoritism norm counsels adjudication by a judge rather
than a jury. Accordingly, it would seem that adjudication of
anti-favoritism claims, including purely factual questions,
should be left to judges for determination, not juries.
CONCLUSION
The anti-favoritism norm has always been a part of our
system of jurisprudence. This Article suggests how a
Negative Statutes of Limitation in the Government Tort Liability Setting, 19 ST.
JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 259, 261 (2005).
233. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2).
234. Cf. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687,
707-10 (1999) (holding that although there is no statutory right to jury trial
under 42 USC § 1983, the Seventh Amendment confers the right to a jury
because a § 1983 action for regulatory takings in which the plaintiff seeks
damages is analogous to common-law tort actions to recover damages for
governmental interference with property interests, and is therefore one “at
law”).
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rejuvenated anti-favoritism norm can once again help patrol
the boundary between government conduct for the benefit of
the public and government conduct for the benefit of favored
private parties.

